1: Longrigg MH1 Iraq MH1
647, 721, 727, 728

[For an account of the British invasion and campaign in Iraq in 1914, the subsequent occupation and the British war-time administration of Iraq in 1917-18, the civil administration by the British from the end of the war in 1918 to 1920, see category 116, pp. 77-121.]

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch, Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at [453] Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable, paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of foodstuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 178 579 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse) greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too, with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 721 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour; the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1960) MHI Iraq MHI

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Dulaym in 1909 brought columns under Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha against them. Two years later a settlement with the tribe was reached by Nadhim Pasha's chief of staff, Ḥasan Ridhā Bey, accompanied as usual by recovery of loot and oaths of obedience. But the new order did not long survive; outrages on the roads recommenced, strife and rivalry for the proud and lucrative shaykhship persisted.

The Dulaym, all-powerful from 'Ana to Faluja, gave little trouble to Government or to travellers after the accession of the stalwart 'Ali Sulayman to shaykhship in 1903. New Khans were built along the route—al-Qa'im in 1907, Khan Baghdadi in 1908. Episodes of disorder in 1909 were followed by one of Nadhim Pasha's negotiated settlements; the region was one in which evident advance had been made by Government in the last generation.

The far-flung 'Aniza underwent no visible change. The two groups of the 'Amarat, with ibn Mijlad the resentful rival of ibn Hadhdhal, remained on bad terms, and raids against ibn Rashid in Najd, against Kurdish villagers in the northernmost Jazira, and against the Euphrates tribes show the range of 'Aniza activity. Fahad ibn Hadhdhal, Shaykh of the Jabal section of the 'Amarat, was still in 1914 nominal Qa'immaqam of Razaza.

Conditions in the lower Delta were as bad as Turkish 'Iraq could show. The tribes of the Ḥilla and Hindiya rivers, profoundly disturbed by the changes in the river levels elsewhere described, showed all the lawlessness of a society unpenetrated by modern communications and unstable in its loyalties as between Government, tribalism, and a reactionary priesthood. The feuds of tribe against tribe furnished sometimes the occasion for a Turkish military intervention, not rarely a fiasco and capable of dragging on into months of war. Passing through these territories was risky for the wayfarer, and the German professors digging at Babylon felt themselves to be surrounded by anarchy. On the lower Tigris the period perpetuated the internecine shaykhly struggles within both the Bani Lam and Albu Muḥammad, with rivals' appeals for Turkish aid and on occasion for British 'protection'; rare but bloody interventions by Turkish troops could not end the recurrent wars between the two tribes, with their volleys of cross-river shooting and refuge sought by the Albu Muḥammad shaykhs at Muḥammara. Interruption of the river steamers by these conditions reached its height in 1908. Nadhim Pasha in 1911 attempted a pacification; but the causes of unrest were too deep for easy removal and the outbreak of world war in 1914 found the two tribe-groups still bitterly hostile, while the outstanding personalities in each, rivals for paramountcy, still led irreconcilable factions in their remote rice-swamps and on Tigris-side.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

619 721 The lower Euphrates country of the Muntafiq owed little during these years to Turkish administration. The record of the time is of strife and intrigue connected, to a remarkable degree, with the personalities of the wilaya capital. From 1900 until 1908 the allegiance of the tribe was divided between Sa'dun Pasha and Faliḥ Pasha, the former as heir to his father's policy of resistance to Turkish pretension, the latter inclined to Ottoman service. Turkish military intervention led to a remembered massacre of their troops at Shaṭra in 1904; but the author, Sa'dun Pasha, found pardon and a way to Government favour by ostentatious backing of the C.U.P. Supported in 1910 by Nadhim Pasha, Sa'dun by his oppression involved himself in a general revolt of the tribesmen, followed by the visit of a Turkish commission of inquiry which led to a reversal of policy against him. Military operations ensued for the hundredth time. Sa'dun himself was decoyed on board a gunboat at Baṣra and sent in exile to Aleppo, there to die in suspicious circumstances. This gave the signal for a general rallying of the Muntafiq to his gallant but shallow and unstable son, 'Ujaymi, who succeeded to the precarious headship of a tribe from which unity and loyalty had been by now for ever banished. This alignment of forces on the lower Euphrates remained, not without sudden and bloody vicissitudes, until 1914. The temporary eclipse of the C.U.P. late in 1912 led to the outlawing of 'Ujaymi and the brief ascendancy of the sons of Faliḥ. But the tide turned; 'Ujaymi was again recognized as paramount, could again lead Muntafiq forces against the Dhafir, support the Amir of Ḥa'il, and create panic in Baṣra. The outbreak of war found him encamped near Zubayr, menacing but undecided.

619 721 423 Areas of maximum unsettlement were not only those by their terrain the least accessible to Government and to the penetration of modern forces, but those also where a fair economic background was precluded by a vicious system of landholding. The annual reallotment of the *muqaṭa'as* in 'Amara sanjaq, with its many examples of Turkish clumsiness and venality: the unreal and tribally repugnant landlord-tenant relationship in the Muntafiq: the tangle of rights or claims in the Shamiya and Hindiya areas as between the Sayid families, the heads of warring tribes and the absentee Baghdadi tapu-owners: in these lay the roots of a profound social uneasiness which provided the Turks and their successors with the most baffling and costly of their problems.

619 Central 'Iraq outside the Diwaniya sanjaq had little tribal history from 1900 to 1914. The Rabi'a were settled and accessible, the Zubayd reduced by secession and no longer bellicose, the fragmented tribes of the Diyalā and upper Tigris calling at most for occasional police action. These were areas where living stood at,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

or just above, a fair subsistence level, taxation was not too irregularly collected, and Baghdadi landlords could make some show of administering their estates. 619

In the Persian border areas of Badra, Mandali, and Khaniqin, distracted as they were at times by trans-frontier disturbance and bickering, these parochial troubles were no general menace to peace. The submontane Kurdish areas of Mosul wilaya passed a half-generation of comparative peace and the slow decay of tribalism. Feuds between rival Aghās or occasional raiding parties of the 'young bloods' need call for no more than a patrol of *Zaptié* or a half-company of the local garrison. In the mountains the case was otherwise. All the elements of a tradition of brigandage, difficult terrain, easy crossings to Persia, and Kurdish resentment of increasing Turkish pretension combined to maintain areas of aggressive independence. The chief of these were those of the Hamawand, the Jaf, and the Barzan tribesmen. The Hamawand during these years more than confirmed their position as a pestilent affliction to all society but their own. With intervals of quietness, their young tribesmen continued to prefer raiding to the dull virtues of cultivation, and for months on end flouted Government orders, grossly insulted Turkish officials, refused to pay revenue, and terrorized the roads. In 1908 their condition of revolt became chronic, and the years following were passed in resistance to, or in eluding, military expeditions which brought no laurels to the Turkish generals. In 1910 a number of the lesser Hamawand Aghās were pardoned; but the truce was brief, their forces besieged Chamchamal, and wider disorders were prevented only by a face-saving settlement by Nadhim Pasha. It lasted for two years. From 1912 to the mid-summer of 1914 conditions in the Bazyan and Qaradagh areas were intermittently as bad as ever, and the passage of most of their tribal force into Persia added there to the confusion in the area of Salar al-Dawla's occupation (p. 72). 619 721

The Jaf were less savage but scarcely more amenable than the Hamawand. The death of 'Uthman Pasha in 1910 did not diminish Jaf supremacy in Halabja, which 'Adila Khanim continued to administer; Turkish interference was not permitted, despite the harmless presence of a Qa'immaqam. The nomadic sections under Mahmud Pasha—accounted in Baghdad as the greatest of Kurdish chieftains, though in person an insignificant, spectacled figure—had no outside contacts save with the settled folk through whose villages they passed, dreaded and unwelcome. The Pasha, after spending months in Mosul arranging the revenue-assessments on his tribe, visited Baghdad in 1911 to be lionized by Nadhim Pasha. Jaf forces were among those fighting in western Kirmanshah in 1912. The period closed without suggesting a *modus vivendi* as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

619 between Turkish claims to govern and Jaf adherence to their
T21 traditional way of life.

The religious Shaykh of Barzan, true latter-day Dere Bey, still held his inaccessible and lawless court across the Greater Zab from the Zibari country. He failed regularly to render to Government even the demanded minimum of respect, and annually embroiled himself with the savage Harki in their migrations. The dispatch of Turkish forces was met by mere retirement to the higher mountains, and the authorities' use of the Harki as agents of punishment was dangerous. Conditions worsened with the half-crazy oppression and Christian-baiting of the young Shaykh, 'Abd al-Salim, who succeeded in 1908; an expedition of Muhammad Fadhil Pasha was inconclusive; and it was left to Nadhim again prudently to accept the Shaykh's excuses and restore him to a short-lived favour. He was again outlawed in 1911 and 1912, crossed to Urmiya to join the Russians, and from there survived major operations against his tribesmen in 1913 and 1914.

Rival of the Barzani Shaykh dwelt, across the Van border, the equally holy and not less tyrannous lord of Shamdinan, Shaykh Ṣadiq of Neri. His brother, 'Abd al-Qadir, was high in the politics of Istanbul; he himself, detested for his greed and cruelty, lived on robbery and the odour of sanctity, reduced his Christian villagers to serfdom, murdered a bishop, and escaped all but occasional chastisement by Turkish armies. His death in 1911 brought Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir hotfoot to claim the inheritance, in vain. Shaykh Ṣadiq's son, Sayid Ṭaha, famed for his obesity, made good his succession and consolidated his family's position on both sides of the Turco-Persian border.

563 In the heart of Ḥakkari country the Assyrian clans still held their own, still attracted the interest of Protestant Europe. Benjamin, a weak unenterprising Mar Sham'un, succeeded in 1903 to the harassed patriarchate and headship of the Millet. Supported by the loyalty and hardihood of his people and notably that of his cultured and resolute sister, Surma, he was yet assailed by the intrigues of jealous cousins and by Turkish suspicions of disaffection. The Archbishop of Canterbury's mission, based on Urmiya and later also on Mosul, could do something for the spiritual, nothing for the temporal standing of the community. The protection offered by Russia at Urmiya was, as the event proved, neither a reliable standby in trouble nor acceptable to the Wali of Van; yet the Assyrians in their plight were ready to turn anywhere for support, and must have turned ever more definitely to the Russians had not war come to apply to their problem the most terrible of solutions.

619 The grim Yazidis gained some ground during this period

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a popular illiteracy still nearly universal; these included an Islamic Benevolent Society, a Cultural League, and a number of literary clubs.

Tribal life in these months passed through a generally tranquil period. Inveterate enemies in the Dulaym were reconciled, land communications to Syria by Dayr al-Zur precariously reopened, and a major settlement on the reopened Ṣaqlawiya Canal was carried out. Pro-Turkish Shammar elements recrossed into 'Iraq. The inlying Kurds made no history. The Diyalā tribes consented to the pacification of many of their long-standing feuds, and vigorous police action had good effect against obduracy. The settlement of Baghdad tribal sections on the redesigned Yusifiya Canal showed a new and hopeful pattern of regulated land-allotment. The middle-Tigris tribes were untroubled, surviving in peace the redistribution of 'Amara *muqaṭa'as* and the nagging claims of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh. In the Muntafiq alone the record was one of crime and restlessness, with violent reprisals and unpaid revenue. The situation, worsened by the wide possession of uncollected fire-arms, was due essentially to the persistent agrarian evils of the province, and could be but partially corrected by Police or Air Force action. The half-independent Shaykh of Zubayr provoked, at last, his own supersession by a normal Mudir. On the frontier of the Sultan of Najd—the title taken by ibn Sa'ud in 1920—the relations of the 'Iraqi Dhafir, 'Amarat, and outlying Muntafiq with the Ikhwan tribes were precarious since the influx in 1921 of fugitive Shammar elements into 'Iraq from the Sa'udi State. Minor raids were exchanged, neither Government being well able to control its border subjects; indeed, it was even whispered that the 'Iraqi monarch, in his private or dynastic capacity, was not unwilling that the anti-Hashimite Najdi prince should be thus harassed. The capture of Ha'il and extinction of the Rashidi State by ibn Sa'ud in November 1921 increased his prestige and pretensions. The appointment of a Sa'dun to command the 'Iraqi desert Camel Corps on the Najd frontier brought a further provocation to the irritated jealousies of both sides, that of personal enmity towards the Dhafir shaykh. The late winter of 1921–2 passed in daily expectation of larger-scale troubles, with the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish, Shaykh of the Muṭayr, in aggressive mood.

Far more serious to the main fabric of 'Iraq were the conditions in these same months on its Turkish frontier and in 'Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turks, despite their total defeat in 1918, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and their own struggles for existence in Asia Minor, never ceased from offensive action on and across the Mosul border. They claimed the Mosul wilaya. Their National Pact of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

648 721 25 January 1920 had asserted that non-Arab Muslim territories, whether enemy-occupied or not, 'could not be divided' from Turkey; Kurdistan was the obvious reference. From this followed the propaganda campaign of 1920: the absurd pretensions to a throne in Baghdad put forward on behalf of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Sanusi, who was brought by the Turks to Diyarbakr in 1921: their resumed control of the border districts and tribes of Van and Julamark: their seduction of the Kurdish chieftains of Rawanduz area, and their mission thither of a civil official with troops. With the wild Surchi predominantly pro-Turkish, and the Pishdar divided, Turkish penetration made progress in the summer of 1921. It was checked by the Royal Air Force, the 'Iraq Police, and loyal tribal Levies in the autumn, only to restart with a sudden murderous stroke by 'Ubaydullah of the Surchi, who ambushed a Levy party and was repulsed again by major operations of the 'Iraq Levies and R.A.F. in mid-winter. But the tribal submission which followed was precarious; 'Ubaydullah remained at large; and early in 1922 Turkish troop movements on the frontier, based on Nisibin and Jazira, presaged a further offensive. Meanwhile the Sulaymaniya area was relatively quiet in the absence of Shaykh Maḥmud and his near relations; but a group of Persian Kurds from the frontier were able to range the Ḥalabja plain, collect 'taxes', ambush a Levy force, and threaten the town until Air Force reprisals scattered them.

563 657 A further problem of desperate difficulty, and closely connected with the Turkish claims, was that of the Assyrians. Their recruitment, first reluctant then eager, into the 'Iraq Levies did not solve the riddle of their ever-demanded repatriation, nor even of their settlement as a compact community in 'Iraq. The death of Paulus Mar Sham'un in 1920 left the succession to a feeble boy of eleven, Ishai. It led to the rapid loss of much of his house's authority to such livelier adventurers as the notorious Aghā Petros of Baz, an international 'crook' with murder, blackmail, and fraud to his credit in both hemispheres—and a brave man. The latter's plan, a desperate *pis aller* reluctantly authorized by the British, was to lead his rabble of vindictive tribesmen in their thousands across hill and dale by 'Aqra to Urmiya. The project ended late in 1920 in wayside looting, savage reprisals, and final débâcle; and the Assyrian community were reconcentrated in their camp at Shaykh Mindan outside Mosul. From here the Urmiya sections of the nation decided early in 1921 to attempt to make their own way back to Persia by way of Baghdad; but of thousands who drew money and departed, the great majority were kept from reaching their homes by the cruel hardships of the road and by Persian opposition. They scattered and disappeared, or returned to seek

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

'645 Naji al-Suwaydi to Interior and 'Abd al-Laṭif Mandil to Awqaf, found room for the usual single Sh'i in the person of 'Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Chalabi at the Ministry of Education, and gave the portfolios of Works and Defence respectively to the outstanding ex-Generals, Yasin al-Hashimi and Nuri Sa'id. A few days later Suwaydi moved to Justice, and the Premier abandoned that portfolio in favour of that of Interior. The new Government was committed to acceptance of the Treaty, to the convening of the Constituent Assembly, and to the defence of 'Iraq's integrity against the Turkish claims now clamorously asserted.

3. THE THREAT TO MOSUL

648' 721 The early spring of 1922 had brought indeed no comforting news from the Kurdish districts and the Turkish frontier. In Sulaymaniya a faction demanded the return of Shaykh Maḥmud; among the Pishdar the stable element under an outstanding personality, Babakr Aghā, was still opposed by a pro-Turkish section; and in mid-March a new Turkish Qa'immaqam appeared in Rawanduz, followed by forces under the notorious 'Ali Shafiq—'Euz Demir', or Iron-shoulder—to proclaim the coming Turkish reconquest of the wilaya.

Late in May troubles in the Zangana spread to the still smouldering Hamawand. Their chief, Karim Fattaḥ, arranged for the callous murder of two British officers, Captain R. K. Makant and Captain S. S. Bond, and bolted for the Turks at Rawanduz. The attempt of these to extend an anti-British or anti-Baghdad movement was checked momentarily by the dispatch of a Levy column and aircraft of the Royal Air Force, while Simko of the Shikak and Sayid Ṭaha of Neri for their own purposes restrained would-be insurgents on the frontier. But as the British forces withdrew the Turks advanced. They occupied Raniya, were joined by the dissident Pishdar, and the conditions which resulted forced the evacuation by air of British personnel from Sulaymaniya, where a Council under Shaykh Maḥmud's brother, Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir, was left in charge. The Turks could now occupy Keui Sanjaq and threaten 'Aqra, while British and 'Iraqi forces held only the inner line of Arbil, Kirkuk, Kifri. But a simultaneous Turkish thrust in September 1922 to 'Amadiya in the far north, where Assyrian resettlement had been proceeding, was repelled by Kurdish tribesmen and by the quickly rallying Assyrians themselves.

Under pressure of these events the High Commissioner, erring perhaps for once in judgement, arranged for the return of Shaykh Maḥmud to Sulaymaniya to fill the vacuum of Government. King Faysal supported the appointment, and lent Kurdish officers from

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

his Army; Major Noel accompanied the Shaykh. But the latter, contrary to the most solemn promises, began immediately to correspond with Euz Demir (who despised him as a savage), to intrigue with the active Turkish Committee formed in Kirkuk by the Naftchi family and other irreconcilable Turkophiles, and to claim the title first of Ḥukumdar (Governor) and then of King of all Kurdistan. The prestige and control of the 'Iraq Government in southern Kurdistan was at this moment, November 1922, at its lowest point, even though Sayid Ṭaha, now a refugee from his home, could with Government help rally something of a tribal force, and British aircraft could disperse the Turks in Raniya. In Sulaymaniya a fantastic régime of extortion and oppression represented 'Kurdish Government', and a mission sent by it to Baghdad proffered highly unrealistic claims.

The first move of Turkish aggression on the northern frontier had been met by a strengthening of British and 'Iraqi forces in Mosul area, and by a temporary residence of the Amir Zayd at Mosul. His popularity, and a visit by the King himself, rallied 'Iraqi and anti-Turkish feeling; but nervousness remained as the extent and actuality of Turkish claims revealed itself. In Europe, meanwhile, the Armistice of Mudania, which in November 1922 closed the Greco-Turkish war and a critical phase of Anglo-Turkish relations, was followed by the first Conference at Lausanne. Lord Curzon here confronted in Ismet Pasha the spokesman of a resurgent and self-confident Turkey, triumphant over disaster and all its enemies. The Turks claimed the Mosul wilaya on grounds of race, alleging that Arabs in Mosul were few, Turks were many, and Kurd and Turk scarcely to be differentiated; on grounds of economics, since most of Mosul trade was with Anatolia: of right, since it had been improperly occupied by the British *after* the Armistice of November 1918: of self-determination, since the population of the wilaya themselves demanded Turkish return. It was indeed essential to Turkey to prevent the detachment from them, under another and perhaps more liberal Government, of a large part of the Kurdish people for whom they themselves proposed (and were later to carry out) a policy of strict assimilation and repression. Curzon refuted the population figures produced, which indeed were ludicrous. He explained objectively the racial groups and their relationships, corrected the economic fictions alleged—since in fact Mosul trade was predominantly with Syria and Baghdad—and reversed the argument based on self-determination; he asserted the claim of a whole and integrated 'Iraq Kingdom with every right to its Mosul province, and reminded Ismet of the Mandate for 'Iraq which had been already allotted and covered Mosul. Nor, in view of the wild terrain and wilder

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

inhabitants, could Curzon agree to the value or feasibility of a plebiscite. The Conference broke up on 2 February 1923, with every difficulty unsolved and with the Turks resolutely rejecting Curzon's offer or threat to refer the matter to the arbitration of the League.

The Turkish National Assembly proceeded, early in April, to award to the veteran American concession-seeker, Admiral Chester, a railway and mineral concession stretching far into 'Iraq; but at the second Lausanne Conference, which was convened on 23 April, wiser councils were manifest. British pressure for reference of the Mosul issue to League decision, a step wholly consonant with world opinion at the time, could no longer be resisted. Ismet maintained all his claims but agreed that, failing direct Anglo-Turkish agreement within twelve months (later reduced to nine), the Council of the League should be asked to arbitrate the dispute. The search for such agreement, pursued in conferences which Sir Percy Cox attended in Istanbul in May and June 1924, remained fruitless. Neither side yielded, and the problem was referred by Great Britain, in face of great Turkish reluctance, back to the League Council. This was to meet on 20 September.

These moves of diplomacy in Europe did nothing, meanwhile, to allay movement and violence in Kurdistan. Shaykh Maḥmud, supporting his band of cut-throat followers by looting the helpless, welcomed Turkish officers at Sulaymaniya, sent delegates to Kirkuk to consult the local Turkophiles, and dispatched envoys even to Karbalā and Najf to enlist support. Refusing the order of the High Commissioner to report himself in Baghdad, he was finally evicted from Sulaymaniya by the bombs of the Royal Air Force and made for temporary refuge at Sardasht with whatever funds and followers he could collect. The vigilance of the Air Force prevented a reoccupation of Sulaymaniya by his bands, and touch was kept with his more reasonable brother Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir. The Jaf and other tribes showed every eagerness to be detached effectively from the orbit of the Sulaymaniya 'Government'.

On the northern frontier the Turks' treatment of their own Kurds was confirming, within the 'Iraq border, Kurdish resistance to their return. Their troop concentrations at Nisibin and Jazira-ibn-'Umar remained alarming, and their occupation of Rawanduz left, while it lasted, a centre for aggressive intrigue within 'Iraq. In the debated land, astride the frontier, Assyrian resettlement had proceeded. Hundreds of their houses had been established in the areas of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, and Zakho. Others had attained their original homes in Tiyari and neighbouring country, and more, seeking to do the same early in 1923, had met the resistance of the

1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Oramar Aghās and returned to 'Amadiya in time to help in repelling Zibari and Turkish attacks on it. The frontier line of the future was still unknown. Some Assyrians were content to stay in new homes in 'Iraq, a few had already returned to Persia, others had proved resolute and successful in regaining their ancestral mountains. All were intensely community-conscious, although the unifying authority of the Mar Sham'un, now resident at Baybad, was sadly weakened. Service in the 'Iraq Levies provided employment for 3,000 to 4,000 Assyrians whose families accompanied them, and whose military prowess under British and Assyrian officers, who were often their own tribal Maliks, was admired. It was the more unfortunate that stories of a vast Greater Assyria to be achieved by French assistance gained credence and helped to poison Assyrian-'Iraqi relations, which the apparent British favour to a foreign and Christian community made anyhow delicate, and which was unassisted by any pretence of Assyrian devotion to Arab and Muslim 'Iraq. A riot in Mosul in August 1923 between Mosulawis and Assyrians was a visible danger-signal; the general 'Iraqi resentment at the arrival of 800 Assyrian refugees from Turkey by way of Syria was another. The warnings of both King Faysal and Sir Percy Cox on the need for mutual restraint and discipline did not prevent further animosity, and in May 1924 a petty squabble in Kirkuk bazaar led to a murderous stampede of Assyrian Levy troops there, with great loss of Muslim life and a legacy of bitter anti-Assyrian feeling.

The recovery of Rawanduz from the Turks, by a well-conducted military operation of the 'Iraq Army, the Levies, and the Police in April 1923 marked a stage in the fall of Turkish influence. Sayid Ṭaha of Neri was installed as Qa'immaqam with a garrison of the Levies. The same military column proceeded next to Sulaymaniya where, since the reduction of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty period by the Protocol to four years (p. 148), it was now essential to make early arrangements for this region's future place in the 'Iraq State. Sulaymaniya was entered in mid-May 1923, and the future discussed with Aghās and townsfolk eager for peace and a secure Government; but since no troops, it was alleged, could be maintained there, the authority of the local Council, left in charge by the retiring column, was short-lived. It was possible to transfer outlying districts of Sulaymaniya liwā—Chamchamal, Ḥalabja, Sangau—to the direct care of the Mutaṣarrif of Kirkuk, leaving but a narrow area still exposed to the brutal follies of Shaykh Maḥmud; but the latter, heralded by a few days of Hamawand looting, returned in July. Ignoring again the order of the High Commissioner to come to Baghdad, he terrorized the countryside, trespassed into areas now under 'Iraq Government authority,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

where electoral rolls for the Constituent Assembly were already under preparation, and provoked punitive missions of the Air Force. By autumn, still protesting his devotion to the British Government, he was again in hopeful correspondence with the Turks and, supported by money looted from the tobacco merchants, planned an attack on Kirkuk and collected 'taxes' from the Ḥalabja and Chamchamal villages. So passed the winter of 1923–4.

4. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The signature of the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty on 10 October 1922 was followed by further drafting and redrafting, in Baghdad and London, of the promised Organic Law; by the completion, and ultimate signature on 4 March 1924, of the four subsidiary Agreements: and, months before these were ready, by the acceptance of a Protocol to the Treaty itself. The Protocol resulted in part from increased British realization of 'Iraqi sentiment on mandatory matters, but still more from pressure by the press and public of the United Kingdom on its Government—and particularly on Bonar Law, the incoming Prime Minister—to diminish British expenditure and commitments in 'Iraq. It was brought back to Baghdad by Cox from London in March 1923, and signed by himself and 'Abd al-Muḥsin Bey on the last day of April. Reducing the Treaty period from twenty to four years, it could not fail of a warm reception by King and politicians alike: only the 'Inglizi' party among the shaykhs and notables, still distrustful of the young Government and fearful of their own rivals, pronounced it a betrayal. The signature of the Protocol, Sir Percy Cox's last act in 'Iraq, was followed on 5 May by his departure. He had, by his intelligence, patience, and benevolent firmness rendered outstanding services to the State. The post of High Commissioner was assumed by no unworthy successor in Sir Henry Dobbs, who had served at Baṣra in the earliest occupation days and returned from India to 'Iraq as Sir Percy's Counsellor late in 1923.

The improved atmosphere and the enthusiastic welcome accorded to the King on his triumphant tours in both northern and southern 'Iraq availed in no way to conciliate the Shi'i 'Ulamā. Their anti-British fulminations, in which a pro-Turkish element was at times strangely visible, were coupled with a renewal in June 1923 of the anti-election Fatwas. The clash between their policy and their Government's was explicit; and when, late in June, a bazaar episode brought the sons of Shaykh Mahdi al-Khalisi into conflict with the police, the King was willing to authorize the arrest of both sons and father. Brought to Baṣra, they left the country and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. In Najf

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645 Education was entrusted to a learned Shi'i politician, Muḥammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, and Awqaf to a venerable ex-Shaykh al-Islam lately returned from Istanbul, Ibrahim Effendi al-Ḥaydari. The Prime Minister held the portfolio of Defence, and with it that of a new Ministry which he created as a timely gesture, that of Foreign Affairs. Nuri Pasha Sa'id became deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, of which the King was titular head.

648* The British Government submitted to the Council of the League on 17 July an Instrument embodying the terms of all the documents now ratified as between itself and 'Iraq. This was adopted on 27 September 1924, in terms which provided for the submission of an annual Report by Great Britain to the Council on its 'Iraq trusteeship: for the assumption by His Majesty's Government of full responsibility for the carrying out of the Treaty: and for abstention from all modification of it by the British or by 'Iraq without League of Nations consent. The Treaty was ratified by King George on 10 November, and by King Fayṣal on 12 December 1924.

5. THE MOSUL SETTLEMENT

635 In the liwā of Sulaymaniya, far from the stresses of Baghdad State-building, the régime of 'Kurdish Government' under Shaykh Maḥmud, which had ruined the countryside and depopulated the town, was by the spring of 1924 drawing to its close. The Chamchamal and Ḥalabja qadhās, now loosely administered from Kirkuk, elected to the Constituent Assembly deputies who included Shaykh Maḥmud's own brother; but the Shaykh himself, after ignoring one more ultimatum and a warning of impending punishment—the warning which was invariably given, on humanitarian grounds, to the people of all villages where as a last resort bombing was to take place—was visited by aircraft of the Royal Air Force in May 1924 and was finally evicted from the town. Sulaymaniya was entered in July by ground troops, cavalry of the 'Iraq Army, and a force of Levies. The administration was thenceforward assumed by the 'Iraq Government, which provided funds to remedy the miserable conditions prevailing. The population of the almost uninhabited city could return with infinite relief to their homes, and by the end of the year had increased to 20,000. Shaykh Maḥmud, skulking in the mountain villages and crossing to and from Persian territory, maintained the hunted existence of a bandit.

563 721 On the northern frontier the re-establishment in their old mountain homes of some thousands of returning Assyrians was to lead to trouble after two years of peaceful resettlement. The district concerned lay just north of the old wilaya frontier, but

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within the area now claimed by the British Government for 'Iraq as an indispensable safeguard for Assyrian resettlement. The provocative arrest and release by Assyrians of the Turkish Wali of Julamark, while visiting Chal in July 1924, abruptly embittered trans-frontier feeling. It was followed by the advance of considerable and long-prepared Turkish forces across the Hazil river into 'Iraq. They were evicted for the moment by Air Force action, helped by Assyrian irregulars gallantly mustered and led—but only to sweep back to attack and burn Assyrian villages and 'Iraqi police posts. Assyrian settlers, to a number of some 8,000 and largely destitute, were driven from their homes to seek safety around 'Amadiya. Neither the usual exchange of protests nor the debates of Geneva could prevent reprisals and repetitions, which achieved all too thoroughly the devastation of Kurdish as well as Assyrian areas of the frontier. Relief work and ultimately house-by-house resettlement, with Government help and taxation remissions for settlers, were provided in 'Iraq for the hapless refugees.

In Geneva the 30th Session of the League Council listened on and after 20 September to the now familiar arguments of the Turkish and British spokesmen, Fathi Bey and Lord Parmoor. The same historical, ethnological, economic, strategic, and political claims were advanced, to meet the same rebuttals and counter-claims. No line of agreement or compromise appeared. The decision accepted in the end by both sides provided for the mission to Mosul of a League Commission of Inquiry, whose verdict, if endorsed by the Council, was to be accepted by both parties. Meanwhile telegrams reaching Geneva and containing mutual charges of frontier violation compelled the establishment of an interim frontier line. This was fixed at a meeting held at Brussels on 29 October, to be known thenceforward as the 'Brussels Line'. It ran somewhat to the south of the alignment claimed by Great Britain, and thereby excluded some Assyrian areas; nevertheless, it was destined to form, scarcely amended, the permanent national frontier.

The Mosul Commission consisted of M. de Wirsen, a Swedish diplomat, as President, and as members Count Teleki, a former Prime Minister of Hungary and distinguished jurist and geographer, and Colonel Paulis, a retired officer of the Belgian Army. After visiting Istanbul and London it arrived in Baghdad in mid-January 1925, and was there joined by its secretariat, by assessors from both sides and—to the dismay of 'Iraqis and British—by two renegade ex-'Iraqis in the guise of Turkish experts, one a Kirkukli of the Naftchi family, the other a brother-in-law of Shaykh Mahmud.

The Commission and its assessors and staff spent some days in

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1921 to 1924. These were in effect successful in reopening the routes, with fair security, and in composing a part of the age-long feuds of the 'Amarat, 'Uqaydat, and Dulaym. Within 'Iraq responsibility was fixed on the Dulaym villages, under the supervision of Shaykh 'Ali Sulayman and patrols of the Dulaym Camel Corps. In safeguarding the Nairn route (p. 172), from the autumn of 1923 onwards, full French co-operation was enjoyed, though the events of 1925 found them powerless to keep order. A transit-trade agreement made in 1925 regulated the commerce of the new route. Mutual assistance over anti-locust measures was ensured in and after 1926.

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The least favourable feature of 'Iraqi-Syrian relations was the continued lack of an agreed frontier, since the impracticable boundary of 1920, still nominally in force, was in fact necessarily ignored. Worse than this was the persistent tribal raiding. Ṭai and Yazidi, Dulaym and 'Uqaydat mutual offensives were frequent; but the most conspicuous offender was Daḥam al-Hadi, a dissident shaykh of the Shammar who, at feud with 'Ajil al-Yawar the 'Iraqi-recognized paramount chief, had moved into Syria and from there raided both the main body of the Shammar and the 'Amarat of ibn Hadhdhal. It proved impossible in 1925 to arrange a tribal conference—the decisions of the Albu Kamal meeting of 1924 had not yet been honoured; and in the year following a major raid by Daḥam was repelled by combined action of 'Ajil, the Royal Air Force, and a squadron of armoured cars. 'Ajil pursued his fleeing rival, looted his flocks, and was in turn repaid by the continuance of guerrilla warfare, with no end in sight.

The hope of good-neighbourly relations between 'Iraq and Najd was long to be disappointed. The Hashimite monarchy in 'Iraq and the resulting 'Iraqi sympathies could not be cordial to a Sultan of Najd who was both Wahhabi by religion and hostile to King Ḥusayn and the house of Hashim to the point, ultimately, of war and triumph over them. These elements could perhaps be palliated by diplomacy; but to impose peace on the tribesmen in their deserts was far more difficult. A major raid by the Ikhwan leader, Faysal al-Dawish of the Muṭayr, and his allies on the Abu l-Ghar post and the Muntafiq shepherds in March 1922 was repelled by Air Force action; but in spite of ibn Sa'ud's apology and the chastisement of Ḥumud al-Suwayṭ of the Dhafir, it added to the alarm felt in 'Iraq, which in turn was exploited for internal political purposes. A result was the assembly of a conference between the two States at Muḥammara. This succeeded on 1 May 1922 in drafting a Treaty which was signed by representatives of both. It laid down the principles of tribal allegiance, assigned the Muntafiq, Dhafir, and 'Amarat to 'Iraq, provided for a later Commission to

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define the ownership of border wells, and agreed on means for the prevention of raids and safeguarding of pilgrim routes. The detailed provisions thereafter agreed were embodied in a Protocol signed at 'Ujayr ('Uqayr) on 2 December 1922. This provided for the first time an 'Iraq–Najd frontier intended to be definite, with a Neutral Zone for shared grazing rights.

But these improved relations did not endure. The Najdi refugees in 'Iraq continued to provoke reprisals by raiding into Najd, an inveterate habit which no Governmental action could correct. To practise it with complete irresponsibility, and to ignore both territorial boundaries and would-be superior authority, was a part of the desert way of life which no new age had yet amended. After the failure of British efforts to assemble a conference of the two rulers themselves, a meeting of 'Iraqi and Najdi spokesmen at last met at Kuwayt, under a British chairman, in December 1923. It proved powerless to reconcile differences, adjourned, resumed its debates, and still failed to agree; and its last hopes were dissipated by a raid on the 'Iraqi tribes on the fullest scale by ibn Dawish in March 1924. The death-roll of tribesmen approached 200, the looted animals 30,000. The aggression was repeated on a lesser scale by another two months later, by two more in December, and yet another in January 1925. At the same time the prestige of ibn Sa'ud had been greatly enhanced by his victories in the Hijaz, which were to end in the elimination there of the Sharifian monarchy and a Wahhabi guardianship of the two Holy Places.

But better times on the frontier lay ahead. A garrison of the 'Iraq Army, with armoured cars and wireless, moved out to the desert post of Abu al-Ghar. Air reconnaissance was provided. In May 1925 the provocative refugee tribes were moved into the 'Iraq hinterland farther from temptation, and others who would follow them into 'Iraq were turned back. An Ikhwan raid on the Dhafir in June was declared to be contrary to the orders of ibn Sa'ud, then busy in the Hijaz. British representatives on behalf of 'Iraq took council with Sa'udi delegates at Baḥra in the Hijaz, and a Treaty was signed on 1 November at that village. Sir Gilbert Clayton who negotiated it, visited Baghdad and explained the agreement in person to the King and Cabinet, by whom it was approved. If implemented with intelligence and goodwill, its provisions could cover reasonably, it seemed, the problems of mutual raiding, compensation, trans-frontier migration, exchange of information, and the channels of official communication. The extradition of tribal offenders was not agreed.

The Baḥra treaty did much for 'Iraqi-Najd relations, but could not avail to stop all inter-territorial raiding. Caravans between the

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Najd oases and south-western 'Iraq began to move freely, and although the mixed Commission for which 'Iraq pressed was not established, the frontier authorities of both sides established friendly contacts.

7. LIFE AND GOVERNMENT, 1921–6

These first five years of the 'Iraq Kingdom built into reality a large measure of the dreams of the earlier nationalists: they saw erected an authentic fabric of 'Iraqi self-government, while steps were taken in every department of national life and government towards the establishment of a modern State. The services of the ablest 'Iraqis from every province were enlisted to the task. The beginnings of a sense of national self-consciousness, in loyalty to this Kingdom which was their own, were forthcoming from elements, albeit still minority elements, of tribe and countryside quite unaccustomed to such conceptions. Administrative ability, it appeared, was available and capable of improvement; and the practical help of 'Iraq's ally on every level, from League politics to a nahiya squabble, was ever at her service. The British part in the Administration, pronounced 'interference' or 'imperialism' by some of the press and resented at times by impatient 'Iraqi functionaries, was exercised with patient discretion by nineteen-twentieths of the British officials. With an occasional maladroitness, it was predominantly helpful and always disinterested; but, necessarily and desirably, it diminished as the years passed, as advisory and executive functions could be more clearly distinguished, and as districts or departments were seen to run successfully under all-'Iraqi Administration. 'Iraqi-British social relations grew into habitual cordiality, often into close friendship. The Turkish régime, four centuries long, faded into the past, and 'Iraq accustomed itself to a new cultural and political orientation, even while so many features of its old characteristic social and economic life endured.

There have been frequent references to the great constructive services of the King and of the High Commissioner. Both were served at this period by able and devoted staff officers: the King by Rustum Ḥaydar, a cultured French-educated Syrian but adopted 'Iraqi, by Taḥsin Qadiri, and by others both loyal and competent in the Court service. The High Commissioners similarly were fortunate in their staffs; these included in this earliest period as Counsellors, C. C. Garbett, followed by B. H. Bourdillon: as Legal Secretary, Nigel Davidson: as Oriental Secretary, Miss Gertrude Bell,[1] whose sudden death in July 1926 was a tragic

[1] In the period 1925–32 Bourdillon was succeeded as Counsellor, in 1929, by Hubert Young: Davidson by Barclay Nihill: and Miss Bell by Vyvyan Holt.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

172 founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

744 The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

619 721 166 622 In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director-general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in succession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

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563 668 murderous Hamawand allies. The Shaykh's retirement to Persia removed for a time the greatest obstacle to orderly government in Sulaymaniya liwā. It could now be resumed, with improved roads and rebuilt police posts. His son, Baba 'Ali, was brought to school in Baghdad—and later to Victoria College, Alexandria—as part of the terms of settlement; he was, years later, to become a graduate of Columbia, and a minister of the Government. The place of Shaykh Maḥmud as leading Kurdish disturber of the peace was taken in the same year, 1927, by Shaykh Aḥmad of Barzan in whose territory 'Iraqi troops had recently manœuvred. This half-witted Dere Bey, obscurely prompted by some resentful megalomania, now proclaimed himself Almighty and gained some converts by the preaching of a devoted Mullā. But the reaction of horrified listeners led to a scuffle in which lives, including his brother's, were lost. It was followed by an intervention of police and the reinforcement of the Army garrison at Bilih, near Barzan. The new religion died out; but the Shaykh, talking and writing war and sedition to all who would listen and spreading rumours of Assyrian trespass, remained a menacing figure.

The Kurdish reaction in 1929–30 to threatened British withdrawal was one of apprehension. The elections of September 1929 produced, as has been recorded, a riot in Sulaymaniya; questions had been asked already by the Kurds in the 'Iraq Parliament as to safeguarding in the new Treaty the 'rights of the Kurdish areas', and had been answered only by the Treaty's silence on the subject. 563 669 721 Expecting support based on the same claims, Shaykh Maḥmud in September 1930 again invaded 'Iraq territory, in spite of specific warnings to desist. He established himself, addressed the High Commissioner to demand a united Kurdistan under British Mandate to stretch from Zakho to Khaniqin, and again occupied Panjwin. Troops of the 'Iraq Army, with Royal Air Force bombers, dislodged him successively from Panjwin and Sardasht, but failed for some months to encircle or drive him across the frontier. Guerrilla war continued through the winter of 1930–1. In March his movement to raise the tribes of Kifri and Khaniqin was stopped by a concerted operation of the Army, Police, and Air Force, and a major engagement took place at Au-i-Barika twenty miles north-east of Ṭuz Khurmatu, leaving a score of dead. The Shaykh fled into Persia, but thanks to preventive action by the Persian Government failed to find there his usual refuge. At an interview at Panjwin terms were once more arranged. His life was spared, an allowance granted, and his place of residence fixed at Naṣiriya on the lower Euphrates.

Between 1928 and 1931 an uneasy peace reigned in Barzan country, where the Shaykh was visited by an Administrative

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Inspector and received the admonitions of Baghdad. In July of the latter year he again lost his wits, accepted and imposed 'Christianity', and ordered his scared followers to conform to his new faith by roasting and eating pork. A number of the horrified retinue obeyed; but a neighbour, Shaykh Rashid of Baradost, expressed his disapproval by raids which kindled all the fires of tribal warfare. Shaykh Aḥmad's brother, Mullā Muṣṭafā, and other well-wishers tried in vain by diplomacy to extinguish them: but he himself, restored to the Muslim faith, led forays of unusual savagery into Baradost country. By December intervention by regular troops was ordered, in spite of the wintry conditions. An 'Iraq Army column, penetrating the mountains as far as the Shaykh's village, was there severely defeated and indeed rescued from débâcle only by Air Force intervention. Aḥmad, chastened by severe bombing, released the prisoners he had taken, protested humble obedience, and withdrew from Baradost country. But he remained unsubdued. In the early spring of 1932, after warnings from the High Commissioner which he ignored, 'Iraqi troops again advanced into his country, occupied Margasur, and threatened Barzan; but a sudden assault on them by tribesmen in difficult country involved them in a second defeat and heavy losses. The R.A.F. was again able decisively to intervene, and a second 'Iraqi column, with strong air support, now occupied Barzan and much of its dependent territory. After a pause for the release of a captured pilot, and further attempts at peace-making on generous terms, land and air operations were resumed. In midsummer the Shaykh, driven finally to bay, crossed into Turkish territory, where he was arrested and removed from the frontier. It was then possible to install a normal or nearly normal administration in Barzan country, with police posts and patrols, and to pardon the miserable remnant of the Shaykh's followers who trickled back.

If these warlike interludes were of a type normal in Kurdistan for millennia, the same is less true of the political action now taken by Kurdish leaders. A petition to Geneva by ten notables of Sulaymaniya in July 1930 demanded a League-supervised Kurdish Government. The Permanent Mandates Commission commented that the League had never envisaged a Kurdish Government but merely a measure of 'special treatment', of which it urged the Mandatary to ensure full application before it be too late. A series of further and similar Kurdish petitions, written in 1930 to 1931, were considered at Geneva in the latter year. They led to the recommendation that Britain should impress on the 'Iraq Government the need of tolerance to evoke the loyalty of its Kurdish subjects: who in turn, however, should earn respect and the League's consideration by a correct attitude to the 'Iraqi Kingdom.

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649 locust-control had grown, though the discrepancy of the two policies towards their wards was manifest. Desert life was characterized by the usual hostilities between the Ṭai, the Yazidis of Jabal Sinjar and the Shammar, which were composed in 1927, and those of the warring Shammar factions themselves—'Ajil against Daḥam—and their tax-avoiding migrations. A successful large-scale assembly of tribal and Government representatives met at 'Aqra in the spring of 1927 and agreed to the cancellation of a score of outstanding claims. Such meetings were repeated in and after 1931. [221] The mass movements of the great 'Aniza sections ignored, as ever, the frontiers assumed by their nominal Governments; in 1929 the bulk of the Ruwalla and Saba'a poured into 'Iraq for grazing and passed across the desert motor route, but tribal fighting, for which the 'Iraqi 'Amarat were all too ready, was avoided by their withdrawal. In 1931 progress in Paris conversations on the still undetermined frontier had so far advanced that application could be made to the League Council to appoint a Commission to trace a boundary based on that of 1920. A Swiss president, with a Spanish and a Swedish member, were appointed for the task. The first of these, Colonel de Reynier, lost his life in an aircraft accident on his way eastward, and was replaced by a fellow countryman, Colonel Iselin. The Commission finished their task in May 1932 and offered their recommendations, which were not unanimous, in September. These were adopted by the League. They involved the inclusion of the whole Jabal Sinjar within 'Iraq, with compensating transfer of territory to Syria elsewhere. The subsequent Delimitation Committee, with the same Chairman, finished its work in 1933. It was notable that in frontier dealings thereafter, as well as before, 'Iraqi tribal and other interests were defended by 'Iraqis, Syrian by Frenchmen.

The grievous events of the 'Iraqi–Najd border in 1927–9 illustrated, all too typically, the effects of confronting the proud but primitive and fanatical bedouin of north-eastern Arabia with a territorial frontier, which they could neither locate nor comprehend, as opposed to one tribally indicated; with an attempt at national discipline in their own country, which they resisted with savage individualism: and with modern weapons, which they resented as evil and unjust. With the penetration of Western conceptions into Arabia, the erection there of a relatively formidable central Government, and habituation to guns and aircraft, the same conditions are unlikely to recur; indeed, they may have passed for ever from the world.

649 The good effect of the Baḥra agreement lasted for two years, and 721 although the establishment of the frontier tribunal envisaged in it was for many months delayed, the peace was kept in the wastes

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south-west of the lower Euphrates and Kuwait. But these hopes were to be dashed. The Muṭayr were led by the truculent Faysal ibn Dawish, already insubordinate to his overlord. They attacked in November 1927 the 'Iraqi outpost at Buṣaya, seventy-five miles inside the 'Iraq border. This tiny mud fort and that of Abu Ghar, ninety miles inland, were held each by a platoon of troops. At least a score of 'Iraqis were slaughtered by the Muṭayr, who were convinced that these outposts were provocative. Strong protest was made to Riyadh, and the Muṭayr pursued by Air Force machines; but they rallied and returned to penetrate yet farther into 'Iraq territory and slaughter riverain shepherds and their children at Jumayma in mid-December. The effect on 'Iraq tribes as remote as the 'Aniza was profound and deplorable; nor would ibn Sa'ud admit, in the correspondence which followed, the legitimacy of the 'Iraqi forts, even though the raids had been made not under but in defiance of his orders. The R.A.F. flew repeatedly over Najdi camps, the 'Iraq Government garrisoned the desert posts of Salman and Shabicha; but the Muṭayr again in February 1928 attacked 'Iraqi and Kuwayti tribes, south and south-west of Baṣra. Ibn Sa'ud was divided between anger at his subjects' indiscipline and resentment at their punishment by foreign arms. Successful in preventing the repetition of major raids, he declined a meeting with the Political Resident in the Gulf, and showed himself intractable regarding the desert forts when visited at Jidda, in May 1928, by Cornwallis and Sir Gilbert Clayton. These abortive conversations were resumed in August, after the pilgrimage, with Tawfiq al-Suwaydi now attending as 'Iraqi representative. They failed again, and the frontier continued to live under the menace of Najdi ferocity. In January 1929 a raid by the 'Ajman killed twenty 'Iraqis in Kuwayt territory, and attacked a motor convoy in which Americans were travelling, killing one of its passengers, Dr. Bilkert, a missionary. This was followed by a greater assault on 'Iraqi tribesmen by 'Uṭayba, with wholesale looting and the slaughter of over seventy people: and this again by Muṭayr and 'Ajman raids with heavy loss of life, still on 'Iraq tribes (the Bani Malik) and still in Kuwayt territory. The activity of the R.A.F., the steadfastness of the 'Iraqi posts at Salman, Buṣaya, Shabicha, and Nukhayb alone saved south-western 'Iraq during these weeks from the same submerging waves of bloodthirsty Wahhabis as had flowed over the Kuwayt principality.

The ruler of Najd again asserted, and no doubt with truth, that the raids were unauthorized, and turned his arms at last against his own disloyal lieutenants. In March 1929 his forces heavily defeated ibn Dawish. The rest of the year was passed by the royal and the rebellious Wahhabi forces in civil war, in which those of the Sa'udi

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563 721 During the first three days of August a few individual Assyrians recrossed the river to 'Iraq to surrender their arms after angry quarrelling with their too hopeful leaders. On the afternoon of the 4th considerable parties, to whom the French had restored their arms, began unannounced to recross, determined to regain their unguarded families. Animated by whatever disastrous folly or malice, some individuals from among them discharged shots at 'Iraqi troops whose pickets faced the river and who were prepared to receive the surrendered arms. The scale of the fighting increased as more of the excitable mountaineers hurried to the front; the Army replied with spirit and substantially held their positions; and a hotly contested combat continued all night and until long after sunrise. The losses of the Army were some thirty killed and forty wounded, those of the Assyrians about half these numbers. In the early morning some 200 of the Assyrians made for the hills in small parties, seeking their homes; the rest with Yaqu and Luqo again crossed to the Syrian side where they were bombed by the 'Iraqi Air Force and, to a number of 533, were interned by the French. The broken stragglers together with villagers and wayfarers on the left bank were rounded up over a wide area and shot by the Army out of hand.

At no time, it is certain, could any Assyrian movement, however widespread and determined, have in any degree threatened the 'Iraqi State; yet such was the feeling aroused by past rancours, by fear and present anger, and by stories (not, it is probable, all untrue) of Assyrian atrocities to the dead or captured, that the 'Iraq Army launched from this point onwards a campaign of singular truculence. It was accompanied by a wave of unprecedented bitterness against the British. Anti-Assyrian measures taken during the following days included the hasty arming of Kurdish irregulars, the search of all roads and tracks for stray Assyrians who were shot at sight, the raising of a force of supernumerary police, and the terrorization by the Army of civil officials who might attempt (as some did) to interfere. The Minister of Defence, Jalal Baban, and the Director-General of Police, Ṣubiḥ Najib, on a flying visit on the 7th showed their zeal by projects to arm and inflame the Kurds against the Christians. Patrols of the R.I.A.F. vied with each other in reports of 'dangerous concentrations' of the now terrified Assyrian villagers. 'Iraq Army troops in Dohuk and Zakho massacred in cold blood not fewer than 100 Christian peasants in those villages. The Kurdish and Arab tribes —of the Kurds, the Sindi, Quli, Sulayvani: of the Arabs, the Jubur, Shammar, Ḥadidiyin—and parties of Yazidis were allowed to understand that the Assyrian settlements would not be protected; and looting, wholesale and unchecked, stripped and ruined almost

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

all their villages in Dohuk, Shaykhan, and Zakho qadhās. Those in the qadhās of 'Amadiya, 'Aqra, Zibar, and Rawanduz, where the civil Government could maintain its powers, were unmolested. Refugees, penniless and hungry, poured into Mosul and into the large central villages of Al Qush and Simayl (Simmel). 563 721

The Minister of the Interior, Ḥikmat Sulayman, toured the affected areas from 11–15 August. He became aware that the immediate requirement of policy was not to continue the current butcheries and lootings but to conceal from the world the truth, which with horror he learnt for the first time; for he had visited Simayl. Here, from 8–11 August, Assyrians belonging to the village and from outside it had clustered for safety round the police station, disarmed but solemnly reassured by the sergeant. Their terror increased when tribesmen were allowed unchecked to enter and loot their homes, their priest was removed, and their Arab fellow villagers moved out with the flocks. On the morning of 11 August, a motor machine-gun company of the 'Iraq Army entered the village in good order under its officers, and proceeded methodically to the massacre of every man in the village. The work was complete by early afternoon, and the troops withdrew in their vehicles. They returned next day to bury the dead, some 315 in number, including 4 women and 6 children.

It is not doubtful that this operation, revolting in its senseless cruelty, was planned and ordered by the Commanding General, Bakr Ṣidqi Pasha, though he had arranged himself to be absent in Mosul on that day. He intended, it was believed, a similar exploit at Al Qush, but was dissuaded. The 'Iraqi official account of the Simayl massacre as the work of tribesmen is contrary to the facts.

The historian has neither need nor wish to pass judgement upon the series of events—not without their parallels, of St. Bartholomew or Glencoe—which began with the foolish and provocative manœuvres of, or indeed the actual attack launched by, Assyrian fanatics and ended with the shocking climax of the Simayl massacre. With their motives of folly, falsehood, hatred, and brutality they show humanity at its lowest. The attitude of the 'Iraqi authorities, central and local, to the Assyrian problem and people had been up to 4 August forbearing and indeed generous: the conduct of the 'Iraq Army thereafter was, in its sustained brutality, beyond defence. These actions were in large part concealed from the public, who were instead deceived by stories of widespread Assyrian rebellion, the gallantry of 'Iraqi troops, and the treacherous designs of Great Britain. This must explain the failure by Government or the public to give expression to any feeling of regret more forthright than the half-excuses of Yasin 563

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Regent and to the Treaty, among them Nuri Sa'id and Da'ud Haydari, escaped from Baghdad and joined the Amir and their colleagues in Palestine. The new British Ambassador entered Baghdad on 4 April without official greeting by the 'Iraq Government save that of the Amin al-'Aṣima, Arshad al-'Umari, and remained invisible in his Embassy, careful in no way to countenance the new régime. Between himself and Rashid 'Āli personally there was little cordiality. The Gaylani Ministry assumed its functions in a Baghdad Army-dominated, socially frightened, commercially inert. The industrial frustrations of war-time—the stoppage of hopeful factories, the impossibility of importing machinery, and the shortage of vehicles—added to the adverse factors confronting it.

The Government's reception abroad was unfavourable. Turkey and Sa'udi Arabia saw with regret the adoption in 'Iraq of a policy the reverse of their own. In London, where these developments had been little expected, the immediate decision was to secure Baṣra and as much as possible of 'Iraq's other centres and means of communication. To this end an urgent request was sent by Churchill to India to produce troops and land them at Baṣra. A brigade of the 10th Indian Division, with a regiment of artillery and ancillary troops, who were on the point of embarking for the Far East, were diverted and sailed from Karachi for the Gulf on 12 April, under Major-General W. A. K. Fraser. They arrived at Baṣra on 18 April, anticipated by a few hours by a half-battalion of British infantry flown there by the Royal Air Force, to be moved on a fortnight later by air to Ḥabbaniya.

Cornwallis, warned on 12 April of the dispatch of troops, informed the Government accordingly on the 16th. Rashid Āli first instructed that all facilities should be given for their landing; but three days later he stipulated that the forces disembarked should move forthwith across 'Iraq to Ruṭba or beyond, that troops in transit should never exceed one brigade-group, and that suitable advance notice of arrivals should henceforward be given. Meanwhile, no more troops were to land until the present forces were clear of 'Iraq territory. These arbitrary and clearly unfriendly restrictions were unknown to the spirit or text of the Anglo-'Iraqi Treaty; and this was pointed out by the British Ambassador, whose first personal meeting with Gaylani took place on 26 April and brought them no nearer together. Extensive flooding around Baṣra must anyhow have made the newly-landed force immobile for a time. The Prime Minister on 27 April repeated in writing his demand that the troops at Baṣra should move on; public opinion, he said, was dangerously deteriorating at the sight of this British garrison. Cornwallis's reply was to give warning on 28 April of the arrival of further supporting or ancillary troops, in approximately

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brigade strength. A second unsatisfactory interview took place between Premier and Ambassador; each maintained his position; and Rashid 'Ali, hinting at serious consequences, laid all blame in advance upon the British. The troops landed, not without signs of popular and military disfavour which stopped short of serious physical opposition. They occupied the Port area and power-station, and prepared for the advent of greater forces. The 'Iraqi garrison of Baṣra moved out, under pressure, to the river bank fifteen miles north of the Qarmat 'Ali river junction.

In spite of the efforts of the British community and most 'Iraqis to maintain normal activities, the position in Baghdad was by these events so strained that British women and children were dispatched on 29 April, by the Ambassador's instructions and with the Prime Minister's specific guarantee of safety, to Ḥabbaniya, whence in the days following they were taken by air to Baṣra and out of 'Iraq. All other British and United States citizens, with some few exceptions—who were to fare badly in the succeeding weeks—were collected on 30 April for safety at the British Embassy on the right bank of the river, at the American Legation in the 'Alwiya suburb, and in Mosul at the British Consulate. Some 360, joined by a few local Jews and Indians, were to spend the next month within the Embassy precincts, which were barricaded and controlled. Official records and cyphers were destroyed. The captives continued precariously to enjoy the Government services of electricity and light, telephone (with interruptions), and water, and to obtain food and other articles from the town. A further 150 were kept, not without 'Iraqi protest at an unneutral act, under the protection of Knabenshue but were unable to communicate with the Embassy. The King and his mother remained for three weeks at their palace outside Baghdad, and thereafter made their way in safety to a hill-station in northern 'Iraq. The British banks in Baghdad were forced to hand over their keys and balances.

During the night of 29–30 April the 'Iraq Army Command moved troops—an Infantry Brigade, an Artillery Brigade, and a Machine Gun Company—by a measure described as precautionary, from al-Rashid camp to the high ground immediately dominating Ḥabbaniya. This force grew, in the two days following, to one of nearly 10,000 men, fully armed and equipped and provided with 50 guns and a number of tanks. The Ḥabbaniya cantonment contained, besides some thousands of civilian workers, 1,200 of the Levies—half Assyrian, half Arab and Kurd—an Armoured Car Company, 80 aircraft of various and mostly obsolete types, 30 trained pilots and as many pupils, about 1,000 other R.A.F. personnel, the infantry half-battalion flown from Baṣra, and two

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ancient howitzers. The camp itself, containing maintenance installations, stores, and a Flying Training School, was militarily indefensible.

The British position in 'Iraq, it was now clear, was more than precarious; it could be sustained only by immediate military reinforcement. The flooded countryside and the 'Iraq Army's control of the Basra–Baghdad railway precluded the dispatch of land forces northward from the Port; and none, indeed, reached Baghdad by that route until mid-June. But the resolution of Churchill and the British Cabinet to hold their position and insist on their Treaty rights in 'Iraq never faltered. General Wavell in Cairo was directed to dispatch forces from Palestine to the relief of Habbaniya and for the restoration of the situation: instructions which were received with dismay, since the Commander-in-Chief was already distraught by wide and varied commitments in Greece, Crete, Syria, the Western Desert of Egypt, and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, a force consisting of a brigade of mechanized cavalry, armoured cars, field and anti-tank artillery, a battalion of the Essex Regiment, three squadrons of the Transjordan Frontier Force, 200 heavy lorries to supply Habbaniya, and a mechanized Desert Regiment of the (Transjordan) Arab Legion under Brigadier J. B. Glubb, was collected and placed under Major-General J. G. W. Clark. His task was to open and hold the lines of communication to 'Iraq, and in that country to relieve Habbaniya, restore the British position, and make possible the restoration of a legal and friendly Government. Moving eastwards by the 'Amman–Baghdad road, a part of this force, formed as 'Kingcol' under Brigadier J. Kingstone, crossed the borders of 'Iraq on 10 May. With Glubb's detachment acting as a forward screen, the column was able to occupy Rutba, which the 'Iraqis abandoned with little resistance, and to reach the Euphrates. The desert pumping-stations of the 'Iraq Petroleum Company, two of which had been heavily looted, could thereby be brought again under control. 'Aniza tribesmen had done much damage to the works proceeding at Lake Habbaniya, and to the machinery in use there.

The fortunes of war at Habbaniya, meanwhile, had bordered on the miraculous. On 1 May the Air Force Commander there, Air Vice-Marshal H. G. Smart, summarily rejected the request of the 'Iraq Commander that all flying should cease; he demanded, on the contrary, the withdrawal of the 'Iraqi forces from positions which were clearly hostile and must place his camp at their mercy. No reply was given; the 'Iraq Army held its ground; and at dawn on 2 May it was bombed by British aircraft. The 'Iraqi artillery replied by shelling the buildings of the Habbaniya camp. For three days this bombardment continued, half-hearted and

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ill-aimed, and failed[1] to hit the vital water-tower on which the garrison depended, or to prevent the evacuation by air of the women and children. British aircraft meanwhile constantly attacked the 'Iraqi forces and gun positions, and destroyed wherever they found it the greatest part of the small but not despicable R.I.A.F., which had consisted of some fifty first-line aircraft, including American bombers and fast Italian fighters. Small reinforcements of aircraft, notably Blenheims, reached the British at Ḥabbaniya from Egypt, and a detachment of Gurkhas were flown from Baṣra. R.A.F. losses in effective aircraft were heavy. Vigorous patrols from the British land forces operated at night against outposts on the plateau, and were little opposed. The 'Iraqi troops made no ground attack at any point on the seven miles of scarcely defended perimeter, which with their numbers and weapons they could have penetrated almost at will. Before dawn on 6 May they withdrew from the plateau, moved eastwards, and halted at Sinn al-Dhibban athwart the Ramadi–Baghdad road, offering the easiest of bombing targets. A sortie from Ḥabbaniya here attacked and dislodged them, taking 26 officer prisoners and over 400 other ranks, with vehicles, guns, and war material. The remainder retired to Faluja. The troops at Ḥabbaniya rested and reorganized, kept watch on the 'Iraq Army garrison behind them at Ramadi, and harassed the enemy with their aircraft.

At Baṣra, meanwhile, the public were sullen and hostile. The newly installed acting Mutaṣarrif was instigated to active unfriendliness by orders from Baghdad, but from fear of reprisals felt unable to carry out his instructions to intern the whole British community. In spite of resistance from the police, which led to the necessity of disarming them, General Fraser was compelled to occupy part of 'Ashar on 7 May. In the unoccupied quarters of this suburb and of Baṣra city, looting by hooligans was widespread. The Mutaṣarrif abruptly left Baṣra on 16 May and anarchy reigned until the formation of a temporary Committee of Notables under Shaykh Ṣaliḥ Basha'yan a week later secured some sort of order. In Mosul the Mutaṣarrif, Taḥsin 'Ali, was removed by the Gaylani Government and the local general substituted, but not until British wives and children had been evacuated to Turkey or, in the case of the B.O.D. Company's families, to Syria. The internment of Englishmen and (to their indignation) Americans in the British Consulate was accompanied by offensive restrictions and complete isolation: by the sight of German aircraft overhead and rumours of Axis military stores arriving by train: and by an ugly attitude on the part of the truculent Mosul townsmen. Officialdom,

[1] In the opinion of some observers, the ineffectiveness of the shooting was intentional.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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as usual, was divided. British personnel of the I.P.C. at Kirkuk were interned, sometimes amicably sometimes rigorously, in various premises of Kirkuk town and fields headquarters. All active operations ceased at Kirkuk, Qaiyara, 'Ayn Zala, and elsewhere, while control of the installations was assumed by 'Iraqi staff until Germans should arrive to take charge. Looting of vehicles, stores, and domestic effects was considerable and at certain pumping stations wholesale. The Khaniqin Oil Company's personnel at Naftkhana and at Alwand Refinery were brought in some cases to Baghdad, in others to Ba'quba where they endured a sordid and dangerous captivity.

The 'Iraq Government, as was apparent after a week of 'war', had evolved no military or political plan to meet an emergency which it had itself precipitated. Security was generally maintained throughout the territory, but the rigid censorship, administrative obstruction, military control, and clashing authority slowed the pulse of all national life. Railway communication was interrupted or ceased. The Army, itself far from single-minded, was handled without grasp or resolution; its Intelligence Services were lamentable, its movements uncoordinated, and the great bulk of its effectives never brought into action, or near it. Its unit commanders took varying views of the situation; many would have refused orders to fight, had they been given. The bombs of the Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm, from the head of the Persian Gulf, descended daily or nightly upon garrisons, barracks, and airports at Qarmat 'Ali, Nasiriya, 'Amara, Samawa, Diwaniya, Ramadi, Qaraghan, and Mosul. The black-out and camouflage operations in Baghdad created more public alarm than confidence, rumours were wild and alarming, and official communiqués of a grotesque falsity were daily issued. The press seethed with its usual diatribes and exhortations. The Mufti, Hajj Amin, emerged to proclaim Jihad against oppressive and infidel Britain, and was supported by other divines. Diplomatic recognition of 'Iraq by the U.S.S.R. was, indeed, announced by the Russians on 12 May, but this move, foreshadowed already by negotiations of some months' duration, was of no helpful significance to 'Iraq. The Axis Powers made no gesture of recognition for the new régime in 'Iraq, though their wireless was ceaseless in its blandishments and encouragements.

But to Gaylani and his ministers this was no substitute for material aid, for which no prior arrangement had been made unless in the vaguest terms, and no concerted time-table prepared. A Turkish offer on 4 May to mediate had been rejected off-hand by the British Government. Naji Shawkat hurried to Turkey on the 8th, failed to convince the Foreign Minister at Ankara of his claims to support, and waited for some days till the return of von Papen from Europe. But he could accomplish nothing, and the attitude

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of Egypt and of Sa'udi Arabia, to which Naji al-Suwaydi proceeded on urgent mission, was equally comfortless for the Baghdad Government. Only behind the scenes and beyond 'Iraqi vision were plans being formulated between German, French, and Italian spokesmen—Abetz and Darlan in Paris, Darlan and Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Ciano and Ribbentrop in Rome—for the use by Axis forces of the Syrian aerodromes, ports and railways, and for the dispatch of French military stores and expert helpers to 'Iraq. For this purpose the Turkish railway was in fact used, to the extent of a few train-loads late in May, with the acquiescence of the Turks which von Papen had secured. But these materials played no part in the campaign; the arrangements, like all those for the German help for which the harassed ministers in Baghdad now prayed, were improvised only after the adventure in usurpation had begun, and without direct German-'Iraqi contact at staff levels. All were inadequate, all too late.

Nevertheless, the German and Italian aircraft and technicians who began in small numbers to arrive in 'Iraq in the second week of May, were of greater and could have been of decisive value. They made their base on the Mosul airfield, were seen at Kirkuk where oil technicians were shortly to follow them, and took part in the operations now impending at Faluja. It was a matter of course that all acts of the German aircraft, which included frequent bombing of Habbaniya, were claimed in 'Iraqi communiqués as feats of the R.I.A.F. A Messerschmidt circling Baghdad airport was in error attacked by 'Iraqi rifle-fire and on landing was found to contain the body, shot through the head, of the son of Marshal von Blomberg.

'Kingcol', the main reinforcement to the British forces, arrived at Habbaniya from the desert on 18 May, in time to join in a concerted attack on Faluja, which the 'Iraqis had lost but retaken ten days earlier. The town was outflanked by airborne troops and by detachments ferried over the Euphrates; and, after a short bombardment, was entered and held with its great bridge undamaged. Assyrian Levies took a conspicuous part in the operation. An 'Iraqi counter-attack in strength was repelled. Major-General Clark was now free to order an advance on Baghdad, where fantastic stories of the strength—and tanks—of the British forces were accepted; but widespread flooding across the direct route, and the tactical desirability of first cutting the approaches to Baghdad from Mosul, led to a delay of some days. A party of the Arab Legion under Glubb crossed the Jazira, cut the Mosul railway near Samarrā, and returned; later, joined by the Household Cavalry, they crossed again to the Tigris, occupied Mushahida, and turned south towards Baghdad. The force encountered enemy troops near Taji, and took up a position in brickfields near Kadhimiya.

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The Mutaṣarrif of Baghdad was captured, released, and sent home. The main body of Clark's force now advanced due east by way of Khan Nuqṭa. Scarcely 1,300 strong, and incomparably weaker in guns, equipment, and supply resources than the opposing 'Iraqi units, it was yet scarcely opposed and, after ferrying across flooded areas, reached the outskirts of Baghdad on 29 May. Its weakness, its flood-restricted movements, and its long and vulnerable communications rendered its position precarious, or indeed alarming; not only was Baghdad easily defensible, but a determined move by a mere fraction of 'Iraq's available forces could not have failed to dislodge and destroy an invader whose only strength was in determination, bluff, and high spirits. In fact, the short war was almost over; the 'Iraq Government and its resistance simultaneously disintegrated and collapsed.

The public had become aware that its Government's challenge to Great Britain had been taken up, that actual war was in progress, and that British forces had appeared, in the air, at a score of places. The Army, never popular and not greatly respected, had done nothing to restore confidence. Communications were cut everywhere, commerce dead, prices soaring, the capital three-quarters isolated. At the Port, British-Indian troops were pouring in, and opposition was already changing to indifference or pleasure. Lieutenant-General E. P. Quinan, accompanied by Brigadier W. Slim (the future C.I.G.S.), arrived to take command on 7 May. 'Iraqi troops at Mosul and Kirkuk seemed generally to support the Government, but made no move; a part of those in Baghdad were in sentiment favourable rather to the banished Regent, and the Golden Square, who had perverted their loyalty, were now powerless to lead them. Desertions were increasing, and became a menace to security. Most townsmen and villagers in the provinces were anxious only to see peace and order restored, though support to the Gaylani régime had been at first not inconsiderable. The youths of Baghdad, armed during May by orders of Rashid 'Āli, boasted and strutted in uniform but were no military asset. No tribal leaders placed themselves behind the Ministry; Shaykh Maḥmud escaped from Baghdad, reached Sulaymaniya, and essayed to raise forces to 'support the British'. There was neither time nor need for Glubb Pasha to fulfil the mission charged with which he had led his men to 'Iraq, that of raising the tribes against the usurping Government.

Early in the last week of May the ministers, preceded by their families, started to leave the capital. Naji Shawkat, Shahbandar, 'Ali Maḥmud, and Suwaydi left for Persia or Turkey. The Mufti hastened to Teheran. On the 28th Rashid 'Āli himself fled from the city. German and Italian subjects—among them Dr. Grobba,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

721 lately back in Baghdad triumphant—left hurriedly for Syria, pre-
648* ceded by such of their aircraft as could fly. The Regent Sharaf accompanied ministers to Persia. Yunis Sab'awi, Minister of Economics, appointed himself Military Governor of the capital, and exhorted the demoralized public to organize a final resistance; but his power, if any, lasted barely a day. He fled; and the Generals were not far behind, abandoning their posts and duties as their ill-judged and mischievous adventure ended in fiasco. The steadfast Mayor, Arshad al-'Umari, alone remained to preserve what order he could, to direct dissolution of the armed gangs of the Youth Movement, and on 30 May to form a Committee of Internal Security with the strong support of law-abiding opinion. On the evening of that day, sponsored by Knabenshue, he appeared at the British Embassy. Cornwallis at his instance sent a wireless message to the G.O.C. at Habbaniya to receive, if he would, a flag
728 of truce that night. Terms of armistice—not of peace, since war had never been declared—were without difficulty arranged between
648* the Ambassador and the Security Committee. They provided for a cease-fire, the continued independence of the country and retention of its Army intact, release of prisoners, arrest of enemy (German or Italian) forces, and the opening of all communications in 'Iraq in accordance with the Treaty: conditions which showed both magnanimity and good sense. A detachment of British troops entered Baghdad on the following day, and British residents in Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk could emerge from a month-long captivity which, not without its humours, had been galling, humiliating, and anxious, to find many of their houses looted. The attitude of the Baghdad crowds was sullen and bitter; the effects of dashed expectations and the aftermath of long-drawn Axis propaganda were slow to disappear.

727 The Regent had passed three weeks in Palestine and Jordan. He
579 returned to 'Iraq on 22 May escorted by his faithful ministers and by a British representative, Colonel G. de Gaury, and broadcast once more to his people. The Guard of Honour which welcomed him to Habbaniya was composed of 'Iraqi troops and officers who had surrendered to the British at Sinn al-Dhibban while fighting for his enemies and supplanters, and who now without effort changed sides again. The Amir entered Baghdad on 1 June, welcomed by the British Ambassador and by crowds of his own well-wishers. But the sinister possibilities of the hour, and the urgent need to install a Government, were overlooked in the glow of acclamation and victory; the night of 1 June and part of 2 June were disgraced by serious bloodshed and looting in quarters of Baghdad, with violent hooliganism directed against the Jews. The outbreak had in large part been organized by the fugitive military

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

officers on the scale, they hoped, of a counter-revolution; it represented partly also reprisals by the Youth Movement, of whom many were caught red-handed, and partly the brutality and avarice of the lowest mob elements. The Committee of Internal Security was caught unawares, the Police proved unreliable and impotent, and order was restored only by troops brought in from outside. At noon on 2 June Jamil al-Madfa'i assumed with reluctance the task of forming a Ministry, and set himself to the restoration of normal tranquillity. A reliable Mutaṣarrif assumed charge at Baṣra.

The movement thus overcome will long bear, in obloquy or praise, the name of Rashid 'Āli. His part in it was in fact both unsought and limited. Willing himself to keep in good outward relations with Britain, at least until her defeat was certain, and never as rabidly xenophobe as many another, he was forced first to specific disagreement and then to actual hostilities with the ex-Mandatary by the pressure of his military backers, whom in spite of all precedent he had hoped to control, and by the impatience of his own closest followers. Unmoved by any principle of loyalty to treaties, basically unfriendly to Great Britain, and impetuous and self-confident by nature, he had yet never committed himself to Germany, as had the Generals and Naji Shawkat; he had hoped always to achieve a subtle neutrality and to gain, if possible, for his country from both sides. Rashid 'Āli's acts in his last premiership represent no settled conviction or resolute policy; he drifted or was forced from step to step. Whoever, indeed, had assumed the premiership on 1 April, in conditions which made the Army leaders all-powerful, must either have played a part not unlike Gaylani's, or soon made way for another to do so. There were other policies, other convictions in the 'Iraq of the moment—but no other power than the Army.

If timing had been concerted with the Germans, and their help punctual, the movement, however achieved, could scarcely have failed. A few hundred German troops, a few score of aircraft, could have occupied 'Iraq and vitalized its Army, could have dominated Persia and its oil, closed the southern doors to Russia, and threatened the Levant from the east. That such was not the outcome followed from three factors: the feeble irresolution of the 'Iraq Army at Ḥabbaniya and thereafter; the failure of the Axis to provide timely help, thanks to the British resistance in Crete and to Hitler's plans for the invasion of Russia; and the rapidity and successful bluff of the light British forces. The British intervention, still today condemned by 'Iraqi irreconcilables as unjustifiable 'interference', in fact saved the country first from military dictatorship, then from certain German occupation, and finally from identification with the losing side in the War.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

IX

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1. PAIFORCE

721 THE directive with which General Quinan landed at Baṣra bade him develop that port as a major military base, secure lines of communication through 'Iraq, and safeguard oil supplies. The first of these duties occupied his forces for some weeks in isolation, except for nightly air convoys to Ḥabbaniya, from the campaign up-country; all routes were cut by the 'Iraq Army, wide areas were flooded, and the need was urgent to organize facilities in the Baṣra and Shu'ayba neighbourhood to accommodate the incoming troops and supplies. The Commanders-in-Chief of India and of Middle East, Generals Sir Claude Auchinlek and Sir A. Wavell, met at Baṣra on 23 May to concert plans. On the 27th a column left Shu'ayba for the north and, after meeting slight opposition at Ur and repairing the railway as it went, arrived outside Baghdad on 12 June; and on the latter day a second force embarked at 'Ashar in an improvised fleet of river craft, and reached Baghdad a week later. On the 18th Quinan with his reopened communications could assume control of all troops in 'Iraq, and the command, hitherto handled operationally from Cairo, reverted to the orbit of the Commander-in-Chief, India.

Its urgent tasks during the summer of 1941 were to place and maintain small garrisons at Kirkuk, Mosul, Faluja, Ḥaditha, Ruṭba, and elsewhere: to be prepared to aid the 'Iraq Police in the maintenance of order: to increase immediately the capacity of the already congested Port: and to develop, for use by major forces, base areas at Baṣra, Shu'ayba, Kut, and Musayib. New air-fields were sited in northern 'Iraq, and steps taken to improve the means of communication by rail, river, road, and telegraph. In June and July small forces were sent to take part in General Maitland Wilson's campaign in Syria against the Vichy French; and in August, with the increased forces then available, it was possible for Quinan to undertake by way of Baṣra and Khaniqin the almost bloodless invasion of Persia which ended with a change of Government and policy in that country, and swung it from dangerous sympathy with the Axis to friendly co-operation with the Allies.

The winter of 1941–2 was of exceptional severity. After a plenary conference in Baghdad in September of the British Ambassadors and Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East it was decided to devote the ensuing months to continued development of the

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territory as a communication and defensive area. This was achieved by the expansion of inland bases and of the Port, where new wharves were constructed, cranes erected, roads and buildings provided: by assuming control of and greatly extending the Inland Water Transport services (on lines reminiscent of the First World War), with the import of a score of small steamers and many barges from India and America, and the requisition of the bulk of existing 'Iraqi resources: by perfected telegraphic and wireless networks: and by the improvement and local duplication of the railway line, and the construction of a new line from Kut to Ba'quba. A German threat, against which these preparations were designed, could come by way of Anatolia or, after Hitler's invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, by the Caucasus and Adharbayjan. The whole of northern 'Iraq must, therefore, be strengthened, and General Quinan prepared positions for this purpose within the triangle contained by the Turkish frontier, the Diyalā, and the Tigris. These works involved great efforts and no small hardship; they called for the use of large forces of local labour and for the provision of the camps, transport and equipment, and the feeding and medical arrangements necessary to maintain them; and they absorbed the two weak Indian divisions—the 8th and 10th, after the departure of the 6th for Persia—which with miscellaneous units formed the 'Iraq garrison at the time. The decision to assist the supply of the Russian armies by supplies conveyed from the Gulf across Persia demanded a formidable organization for procurement and forwarding, based on Baṣra; and in this the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the British companies at Baṣra played an invaluable pioneer part. It led to a great expansion in the Persian railway and road systems, not least in the close neighbourhood of Baṣra and the 'Iraq frontier where the teak-built 1,150-ft. Hull Bridge across the Shaṭṭ-al-'Arab was the first bridge in history to span this river. The railway terminal at Khaniqin became simultaneously an important forwarding base.

So passed the winter of 1941–2. The British forces in 'Iraq and Persia, then as always predominantly Indian in composition, were regrouped in the early days of January 1942 as the Xth Army, and passed again to the Middle East Command. During the spring the tasks of the winter were continued, with the scale of traffic constantly increasing on rail and river, on the desert highway to Palestine, and in base and advanced areas. If the invasion of Egypt by Axis forces in the spring of 1942 led to the dispatch of some combatant units from the Xth Army to the Levant, the deeper penetration of Nazi forces into south Russia in the summer, with the threat of access to Persia and 'Iraq by the Caucasus, seemed to

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721 increase the danger to these countries. This serious situation led early in August to the British decision to reinforce the Xth Army; it was to become an effective fighting formation instead of one specialized for defensive and forwarding functions, and thereafter as the 'Persia–'Iraq Force', or familiarly 'Paiforce', was to be the responsibility of a Commander-in-Chief of its own, directly subordinate to the War Office. General Sir H. Maitland Wilson was selected for the command, and reached Baghdad in August. The fresh troops destined for 'Iraq–Persia started to disembark at Baṣra in and after September 1942. They were the 5th and 56th British Divisions, soon to be followed by the 7th British Armoured Brigade from India, and the 5th Indian and 3rd (Carpathian) Polish Divisions from Middle East. These troops were as far as possible moved to areas in northern 'Iraq and northern Persia, though retirement to the vicinity of rail-heads was inevitable for supply reasons in the winter. The Poles, who were arriving at Khaniqin as refugees in increasing numbers from Persia, were placed under military training and later added to the Polish formations created in Middle East under General Anders.

Two Corps, the 3rd and 21st Indian, were organized from the troops available in Paiforce: they consisted in all, by the end of 1942, of two British divisions and a British armoured brigade, three Indian divisions and an Indian armoured brigade, and one Polish division with the expectation of another still under formation. The 'Iraq Army for its part was prepared, should the threat from the north-east materialize, to take its place with these in the defence of the passes leading from the Urmiya district. The successful defence of Stalingrad, however, gave time for the preparations in 'Iraq and Persia to be perfected; and in the early months of 1943 the final blunting of the German menace absolved Paiforce, after all, from a fighting rôle. It was possible before the middle of that year to transfer a number of formations and units to North Africa, there to join in the pursuit of a beaten enemy. General Wilson was transferred in February 1943 as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, under which Headquarters Paiforce was thenceforward grouped for the remainder of its lifetime. He was succeeded in Baghdad by Lieutenant-General Sir H. P. Pownall, who was in turn relieved a year later by Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Smith. These officers, as it fortunately happened, each possessed the qualities of comprehension and sympathy which the location of their forces in the heart of an allied country demanded.

The tasks of Paiforce during its later career were the maintenance of communications and stability in the area, and the training of troops, especially the Poles, for use in other theatres. Its further duty in Persia was the increase of supplies to Russia by the

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trans-Persian route. In the latter function the American Army had, from the early days of 1943, the major part to play and, with the deployment of its vast resources, took charge of the arrangements for improving the railway and road network of the Shah's empire and forwarding thereby millions of tons of supplies, transport, and equipment to the depots of the sullen and ungrateful Russians.

The peaceful history of this 'Second Occupation of 'Iraq'—so called by one school of 'Iraqi thought—could not but affect the political background of the territory during these years by its guarantee of comprehensive security, its frustration of any further attempt to involve 'Iraq in the downfall of the doomed Axis, and its living proof that accepted garrisons of well-disciplined and well-disposed foreign troops could be far from a scourge to town and countryside. If the British forces by their immense local disbursements for goods and services, their employment of labour, their competition for the services of the few skilled artisans, and their shipment of grain and animals to other theatres of war inevitably contributed to the inflation and the connected economic evils of war-time 'Iraq, they created also the remarkable prosperity which most classes of the population enjoyed. Nor could observers fail to recognize the excellence of the relations maintained, during five years of mental strain and physical propinquity, between these troops and the civil population. Under the inspiration of the Ambassador and his staff every consideration was shown to the 'Iraqi authorities and public, and these for their part wisely acquiesced in the temporary presence of British troops in their territory. Neither the conduct of troops nor the military authorities' use of their predominant power could be the subject of complaint; indeed, the slight extent to which the normal administration was affected by, or needed to take account of, the British forces was surprising. Relations with the 'Iraq Army varied from outwardly correct to nearly cordial; with the Regent they were excellent. He accepted in 1943 the honorary rank of Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force, and a dozen high officials of Government were awarded, for valuable war-time services, various (honorary) grades of the Order of the British Empire.

The British position in 'Iraq during these years was, by force of circumstances, as different effectively from what it had been from 1932 to 1941 as it was different constitutionally from mandatory times. It was clearly dominant, had dominance been desired; but in fact it was more concerned to strengthen the hand of the 'Iraq Government than to supersede it. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, from whose character and experience the nation was thus able again to benefit, remained at the Embassy until 1945 to link amicably the British military and the 'Iraqi civil worlds, and to offer objective

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and benevolent advice to the Government. He was helped in keeping touch with all parts of the country by a small staff of Political Advisers resident, as observers only, in north, central, and southern 'Iraq. While an element of Anglophobe bitterness persisted among disappointed Army officers, ex-internees, and rancorous intelligentsia, the general tone of the public, especially in village, tribal, and non-political circles, was complacent or friendly to the British 'occupation'. Many joined Miss Freya Stark's 'Brotherhood of Freedom', a movement which claimed 600 committees and stood for a broad sympathetic support of democratic values; and many were receptive of direct British information and propaganda, realized the help which the Army was able repeatedly to give in civilian needs and interests, and heard with pleasure of the foundation in London of an Anglo-'Iraq Society in March 1944.

The Ambassador was relieved by Sir Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, formerly British Minister in Jidda, in the spring of 1945. The reduction of Paiforce was by that time well advanced. It had diminished the scale of its construction works (with resulting local unemployment), had removed most of its emergency railway lines, had parted with control of the river transport, and narrowed the perimeters of its vast Shu'ayba and Musayib camps. It was to disappear finally in 1947, after disposing locally of vast quantities of stores, and to leave behind it a considerable legacy of permanent improvement in the form of buildings and equipment in the Port, railways, and roads of the territory.

2. THE MIDDLE WAR YEARS

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The crisis through which 'Iraq had passed in May 1941 justified, when once the position was restored, the firmest of Governments. The sullen disaffection of the Army, the weakening of the Administration, the muttering among members of the disbanded Youth Organizations, the threats of fugitive Gaylani partisans that their struggle was but beginning: these features increased the dislocations and abnormalities of national life and, as war conditions began to assert themselves, called for a strong and a skilful hand.

It was not forthcoming. Madfa'i, whom patriotic duty alone had induced again to accept power, treated the situation as merely the aftermath of one more political episode and adopted easily the rôle which had fallen to him after Ṣidqi's murder—that of 'dropping the curtain' on past misdeeds. The gap between the measures which he took and those indicated by 'Iraq's position and needs was indeed so clear that his early supersession was inevitable.

The Cabinet which he installed was one of experienced politicians, with no new blood. Nuri Sa'id, whose presence in the capital could have been embarrassing to Madfa'i, betook himself to Egypt

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as Minister. The portfolio of Foreign Affairs was given to 'Ali Jawdat, Interior to the tough and experienced Muṣṭafā al-'Umari, Works to Jalal Baban, Finance and temporarily Justice to Ibrahim Kamal—in whom many saw a future Prime Minister—and Economics to Naṣrat al-Farsi. The two Shi'i Ministers were Ridhā al-Shabibi at Education, and Ja'far Ḥamandi at Social Affairs. This Ministry met cordially the suggestions of its ally as regards the stationing of troops at strategic points, the acceptance of joint control at the Port, and a censorship suited to war conditions. The Italian Legation was expelled, a few subversive Palestinian and Syrian teachers repatriated, and the enemy propaganda machine thereby seriously dislocated. Normal administration was everywhere restored, and local authorities encouraged to initiate progressive works. The tribes were quiet, the Kurds for the moment inactive. The accidental shooting of their Qa'immaqam by the Yazidis had no repercussions. But the Ministry failed in a firm orientation of war policy, and notably in its half-hearted attitude to the known trouble-makers, indulgence to whom among the menaces of war was dangerous folly. The policy of the Cabinet was appeasement. Few arrests were made, although those few included 'Abd al-Wahid and others of the incorrigible Euphrates shaykhs. Mutaṣarrifs through misguided clemency were discouraged by ministers from firm action, and too little was done to purge the Administration itself. Preparations for an internment camp at Fao were allowed to drag on.

The resignation of Ibrahim Kamal in September seemed likely to be followed by the formation of a Ministry by this able, impatient statesman; but he commanded insufficient support, and the Regent preferred, since a change was necessary, to send to Egypt for Nuri Sa'id whose qualities were those which the times demanded. Jamil al-Madfa'i resigned on 7 October, and two days later a Royal Irada announced that Nuri had formed a Cabinet, his sixth. He brought the vigorous and competent Shi'i, Ṣalih Jabr, to the Ministry of the Interior—the first Shi'i ever to fill this post—and to act also in Foreign Affairs. 'Ali Mumtaz went to Finance, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam to Justice, Taḥsin 'Ali to Education, Muḥammad Amin Zaki to Works, 'Abd al-Mahdi to Economics, Jamal Baban to Social Affairs. It was upon the two first-named of these ministers that the chief burden of administration must fall.

Cabinet changes occurred in February 1942 when Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji took the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for four months only), and in April when Da'ud al-Ḥaydari replaced Baṣṣam at Justice, and 'Abd al-Mahdi took from Amin Zaki the portfolio of Works. The Prime Minister retained that of Defence and pressed on the British Ambassador his desire and that of the Army for a

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specific rôle to play in the defeat of Hitler; but his offer of two brigades for North Africa was not accepted. With the Regent's support he showed, nevertheless, appropriate vigour in the arrest of the disloyal, though certain well-protected Nazi sympathizers remained untouched (and even retained high office) and zeal was for a time diminished in mid-1942 by the successes of General Rommel in the Western Desert. The camp at Fao was soon in use. It was followed later by another at the desert post of Salman, and yet another on the riverside at 'Amara, to which all the detained were ultimately transferred; the number of these rose at its greatest to some 350. A number of 'Iraqi fugitives captured by the British in Persia were held for a time at Ahwaz, and later taken for trial to Baghdad or for internment to Rhodesia. The Ministry of Education was submitted to a complete and much needed overhaul. Some dozens of the less efficient officers of the 'Iraq Army—or, said his enemies, of those unfriendly to Nuri—were removed, and conscription applied with a wiser indulgence in tribal areas.

Relations with Japan and with Vichy France were broken off soon after the Sa'idi Ministry took office. A Minister, 'Ali Jawdat, was sent for the first time to Washington in March 1942, soon after the regretted death of Paul Knabenshue in Baghdad; and the benefits of American lend-lease supplies were enjoyed from May onwards. The Prime Minister was able late in the same year to obtain a resolution of the Chamber in favour of adhesion to the United Nations Declaration of 2 January 1942, and was known already to be contemplating a declaration of war against the Axis, a condition of such adhesion. A treaty was concluded with China, whose Minister to 'Iraq resided at Teheran.

The Axis press and propaganda-machine continued to paint 'Iraqi conditions as those of brutal British domination, slave labour, daily conspiracies, sabotage, and tribal ferment: grotesque perversions which were supported by the presence in Europe of Rashid 'Ali (who broke his parole by leaving Turkey), Naji Shawkat, Fawzi Qawuqchi, the Mufti, and others. These fugitives were received by Mussolini, Ribbentrop, and Hitler himself, and broadcast their version of the 'Iraqi situation on demand. Meanwhile, their former colleagues in 'Iraq fared less well. A special Court was set up by the Sa'idi Ministry late in 1941 and in March 1942 sentenced to death, in absence, Rashid 'Ali and two of his ministers, Yunis al-Sab'awi and 'Ali Mahmud al-Shaykh, and three of the Golden Square, Fahmi Sa'id, Mahmud Salman, and Salah al-Din Sabbagh. Long sentences of imprisonment were passed on Naji Shawkat and the Chief of Staff, Amin Zaki Sulayman, and shorter on the former Minister of Education, Dr. Hasan Salman, and the Director of Propaganda, Sadiq Shanshal. The trial of other and

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similar offenders was postponed until they could be produced before a Court; these were Naji al-Suwaydi (who died soon afterwards in Rhodesia), three other ministers—Muḥammad 'Ali Maḥmud, Musā al-Shahbandar, and Ra'uf Baḥrani—Kamil Shabib, the fourth member of the Square, and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gaylani, the late Prime Minister's cousin. The delivery to 'Iraqi justice of a number of offenders caught by the British in Persia led to the re-trial of some of those already condemned in absence. The death sentence was now passed and executed on Yunis al-Sab'awi, Fahmi Sa'id, and Maḥmud Salman; prison sentences of seven and five years respectively were passed on 'Ali Maḥmud al-Shaykh and General Amin Zaki. Ṣādiq Shanshal was acquitted, and the other sentences confirmed. Many attempts, of familiar type, were made during the trials to influence the course of justice.

The personal stresses arising from these measures, and more generally from Nuri's policy of whole-hearted support of Great Britain even in the darkest days, led to ministerial uneasiness which was increased by differences on the measures demanded by the now serious economic situation. It was shown by the attempted resignation during the summer of 'Ali Mumtaz and 'Abdullah Damluji, and produced an effect of partial paralysis of the administration. The Ministry resigned on 8 October 1942 after exactly a year of life, and was succeeded by another, the seventh, under the same premiership. Retaining Ṣaliḥ Jabr at Finance and 'Abd al-Mahdi at Works, Nuri Pasha allotted Interior to his brother-in-law Taḥsin al-'Askari (brother of Ja'far), Foreign Affairs to Dr. 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh—a graduate in economics and dentistry—Justice to Da'ud al-Ḥaydari, Education to Taḥsin 'Ali, Economics to the Najfi business man Muḥsin al-Shallash, and Social Affairs to another ex-Mutaṣarrif and judge, Aḥmad Mukhtar Baban, a Kurd only in name. This composition was shortly afterwards modified by the retirement of 'Abd al-Mahdi and Shallash in favour of Salman Barrak of Ḥilla in Economics and the young Shi'i ex-Mutaṣarrif, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Uzri, in Social Affairs.

The establishment of this Ministry was followed by a State visit of the Regent to Cairo where he was royally received by King Faruq, revisited Victoria College, and passed on to inspect the field of Alamein. His nephew, King Fayṣal II, now growing into an intelligent and promising boy, broadcast in English and Arabic on his eighth birthday, 2 May 1943.

Among the Ministry's first acts was to declare war on Germany, Italy, and Japan, alleging the sinister interventions of these Powers in its affairs, and issuing a Green Book in support of its policy. The Turkish Minister assumed charge of French and Japanese, the Swiss Consul of German interests. Cordial telegrams were

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exchanged between Nuri Pasha and Mr. Churchill: but no important practical results could be expected from this move, which at best would serve to secure for the country a better place at the Peace Conference, and meanwhile to establish its leadership in the Arab world. Public opinion, which showed neither enthusiasm nor dismay at the declaration of war, and felt little resulting sense of obligation, was unlikely to support its Prime Minister to the extent of sending 'Iraqi troops abroad; nor was the Army yet capable of foreign operations. This condition improved gradually with the Allied successes in North Africa, visits were organized for 'Iraqi officers to the Libyan battlefields, and the British Mission under Major-General G. Bromilow, successor to Major-General Waterhouse, did what it could to restore Army morale and comradeship. Meanwhile, in default of fighting, 'Iraq's contribution to the Allied war effort was not negligible; camp sites and lands were offered without rent, buildings were surrendered under requisition without demur. Economic controls were introduced under British advice; the management of river traffic and the Port was shared or surrendered, and the widest military use of the railway system accepted. Priority was given to Army man-power requirements, the telegraph and telephone system placed at military disposal, and grain supplies provided.

Difficulties of procurement, and the economic unbalance which was afflicting 'Iraq at this period, prevented the pursuit of such major projects as had been intended. Nevertheless, urban development could proceed—not least in the capital—suburbs could be planned and partly built, and a beginning could be made with working-class dwellings to replace insanitary labyrinths of mud and petrol-tin hovels: indeed, the war years witnessed great changes in the aspect of the towns. Municipal institutions themselves were multiplying and developing; and, small as were the resources of most corporations, the total of their revenues tripled *during these five years. By a pleasing gesture the Lord Mayor of* London presented, with suitable fraternal messages, a chain of office to the Amin al-'Asima. The Health services continued to develop. Doctors working for the Administration and private practitioners increased in numbers, recruited mainly from the Royal Medical College in Baghdad. British specialists, who had served the country and their science now for twenty years, still played their invaluable part. In Education also the period was far from one of stagnation. A revised Public Education Law was passed; primary, intermediate, and secondary schools—boys, girls, and mixed—all rose in numbers, and many new private schools were founded. Pupils sent for higher studies abroad were few during the war, but the flow recommenced strongly in 1944. A

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secondary boarding school on European lines was founded in Baghdad in 1941, the King Faysal College. Mosul Technical School was reopened in 1942, and another in Kirkuk in 1945. The Queen 'Aliya Institute for the higher training of women teachers was founded in 1945, and a higher Engineering College in 1942; but a College for Physical Education, opened in the latter year, survived only four years. The Institute of Fine Arts, with separate faculties of Music, Painting, Sculpture, and Dramatic Art, was founded in 1941. Professor H. R. Hamley served as Adviser to the Ministry of Education—the first after a lapse of ten years—in 1942–3, K. J. Ritchie in 1944–5, and C. H. Scaife of Cairo University thereafter for two years. The Department of Antiquities was fully active; it carried out excavation at Tall 'Uqayr, fifty miles south of Baghdad, in 1940–1: at Dayr on the Yusifiya Canal in 1941; at the 'Aqar Quf in 1942–4; at Tall Ḥasuna near Mosul in 1943–4: at Ḥira near Kufa and Tall Harmal near Baghdad in 1945. The greatest part of these works was carried out by 'Iraqi scholars, who had acquired high qualifications.

The Administration itself, gravely shaken by the events of 1941 and the strains which followed, and confronted with new tasks and new temptations, lapsed perceptibly both in efficiency and integrity. Neither ministerial unity nor the administrative grasp required to correct this weakness was forthcoming, and resulting conditions led to renewed complaints against 'the old gang' by critics who pressed for the infusion of new blood into the Cabinet, preferably their own. The middle and later periods of the war gave, indeed, no scope for military coups, the incitement of tribesmen, or inspired strikes; but they permitted all too much of the personal intrigues, the intemperate mutual criticism, and the irritated frustrations of normal times.

The inspiring war news from Libya and Tunis in the winter of 1942–3 was greeted by public holidays and the renaming of streets, and extinguished the lingering hopes of Nazi sympathizers: hopes which the capture in July of three German officers, dropped near Mosul by parachute with a Kurdish guide, did nothing to restore. The improved atmosphere led to a turn of ministerial policy towards increased indulgence to the internees of the 'Amara camp and Rhodesia; the resulting releases, considered sadly premature by the British Embassy, were followed by the reinstatement in public functions of men known for violent anti-British and anti-Hashimite sympathies.

Useful non-political work had been done meanwhile by a Committee of Senators and Jurists, with Drower and Edmonds as advisers, on an amendment to the Constitution designed to correct some evident present inadequacies. The Committee met early in

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theme for hostile schoolboy agitation in the streets of the capital. The Ministry's appeal for unity and tranquillity, and another by al-Ṣadr in person, were alike unheeded, and the work of administration, in which the Prime Minister had neither interest nor competence, was largely ignored. The near-famine conditions among the poorer classes could not be cured until after the harvest, which itself promised to be scanty; meanwhile an Australian grain ship was by British initiative diverted to Baṣra and its urgently needed stores distributed.

The death of Ḥamdi al-Pachachi on 27 March led to changes among the uneasy ministers. 'Umar Nadhmi had resigned and been replaced at Justice by Najib al-Rawi, who handed his portfolio of Social Affairs to Ḥaydari. Naṣrat had succeeded Madfa'i at Interior when the latter became President of the Senate, and was himself succeeded when he moved to Foreign Affairs by Muṣṭafā al-'Umari who could thus 'control' the forthcoming elections. The Amir al-Rabi'a resigned and went home in April. Muḥammad Mahdi al-Kubba left the Ministry early in June. The frequent absences of the Ministers of Finance and Justice at Arab League meetings led to constant interchange of ministerial duties, from which the shaken and demoralized Administration suffered.

The Chamber met on 26 June, after elections in which legal and illegal parties alike had put forth all their efforts, and which had produced street fighting in Kadhimiya, Baghdad, and Sulaymaniya. The Independence Party secured four seats, the National Democrats two, the Liberals one. All other deputies were free of party attachment and as such were likely to vote for any Ministry in power; it was clear that the enthusiasm, or the leadership, of the parties had still too little appeal to seduce the electorate from the familiar candidates of local importance in their constituencies or to resist the conservative influence of controlling officialdom. A Chamber—or an electorate—divided on true party lines was still an unrealizable conception.

The new Parliament was confronted, to its dismay, with a situation containing new and alarming features which events in Palestine had created. The United Nations decision for Partition, taken in November 1947, had led in 'Iraq as elsewhere to angry remonstrance, and in the Arab League to emergency meetings. But no hopeful measures could be taken or planned at these; the lines of cleavage within the League were already too clear, and most of the States members too doubtful of their own stability. The earlier decision to encourage the infiltration of guerrilla fighters from each country into Palestine, for the stiffening of local resistance, was carried out to a limited extent. Some hundreds—or, as some said, two battalions—of young and a few veteran

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'Iraqis, recruited by the Palestine Defence League, entered Palestine and served or offered to serve with Fawzi al-Qawuqchi and the Palestine leaders; they were inspired perhaps by genuine devotion but were of negligible fighting capacity. The inefficacy of this force, and the collapse of Arab resistance in the face of Jewish terrorism and their resolute forces, led the League to decide, before the official end of the Mandate, upon the intervention of Arab regular armies. In April the Regent, whose leadership and vitality regained him much of his popularity, visited 'Amman and Cairo with the Ministers of Defence, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Student hunger strikes were called in Baghdad to urge the dispatch of the Army to Palestine, the closure of the Haifa pipeline, and a welcome for the Palestine exiles; and the Government of al-Ṣadr saw no alternative to following the League policy of large-scale intervention, however sketchily co-ordinated. 'Iraqi forces under General Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib—forces ill prepared, ill equipped, and with clearly inadequate supplies and reserves—moved from their home stations some ten to twelve thousand strong in mechanized or lorry-borne units, and took up positions on the western fringes of the Jordan Kingdom. They crossed into their allotted sector of Palestine on 15 May, immediately after the State of Israel had been proclaimed.

The outbreak of this war—the first occasion upon which its troops were used abroad—was the signal for the imposition of martial law throughout 'Iraq: a step happy only in its immediate restoration of outward tranquillity, but indicative of no real solution of any of the nation's problems. The emergency régime, which facilitated Government control over the elections, was marked by strict censorship, the opening of a concentration camp in the southern desert for the many arrested trouble-makers, the subordination of civil to military officials in all areas, and the establishment of military courts. It prohibited the carrying of firearms and the use of cypher codes, and by the supersession of many existing laws it involved a close restriction of civil rights. The clash between civil and military authorities increased as weeks went by with irritation, jealousy, and charges and counter-charges of indiscriminate severity or weak indulgence: Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams were soon heard to ask 'Which is the worse, government by students or by Army officers?' The press, swollen to an extraordinary number of daily sheets of trifling circulation but irresponsible violence, lost in a day the worst of its venom (except such as could be safely directed against the British or the Jews), and the few papers which refused compliance were suppressed. A ceremonial parade of the police in Baghdad did something to restore their morale. The Palestine war aroused enthusiastic

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722 verbal support in every quarter and the Baghdad Jews vied ostentatiously with Muslims in anti-Zionist fervour and subscribed heavily to funds for the refugees.

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The many attempts to restore peace to Palestine and solve its insoluble problems, the murder of Bernadotte by the Jews, the renewal of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities from October to the end of 1948, form no part of the history of 'Iraq. 'Iraq Army units remained in occupation of the east Palestine triangle for some months, dependent as ever on their long line of communications through Jordan and receiving their pay irregularly from the almost empty Treasury at home. Ṣalih Ṣa'ib was recalled to 'Iraq as Chief of Staff, to return again to Palestine later as Commander-in-Chief of the combined 'Iraqi-Jordan forces; but this experiment in joint command lasted but a few weeks, and the wider project of a unified command for all League forces—a clear military necessity—was frustrated by division among the States and by Egyptian refusal. No real effect was given to the resolution of the 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4,5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

deputies and Senate in November that 'unified military and political plans for the redemption of Palestine' should be adopted; the idea was already unrealistic before the end of the year. Units in Palestine and Jordan were visited repeatedly by the Regent, who did more than the ministers of his bewildered and irresolute Government to inspire such national effort as was possible. The nominal and absentee 'Government of all Palestine' announced by the Mufti, Ḥajj Amin—an irritant certain to envenom inter-Arab relations—was recognized by 'Iraq to please the Egyptians.

3. *PLUS ÇA CHANGE . . .*

The general elections were carried out four days after the first truce in Palestine had become effective, and when Parliament met on 21 June the resignation of Muḥammad al-Ṣadr's Ministry was offered and accepted; it had possessed little authority, had failed to restore order save by imposing martial law, had neglected current administration, had allowed an alarming financial deterioration, and now bequeathed a disheartening legacy at home and abroad.

The Regent's choice of a successor fell unexpectedly upon a statesman formerly prominent but, through long residence in Europe, now in imperfect touch with current politics: Muzaḥim al-Pachachi. He claimed to be of no party and selected a Cabinet of long-familiar figures; Muṣṭafā al-'Umari was to serve at Interior, 'Ali Mumtaz at Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Kubba at Justice, Bassam at Defence, Jalal Baban at Works and Social Affairs, Rawi at Education, and a single newcomer, 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan, a young Ḥilla landowner, at Economics. 'Ali Ḥaydar Sulayman, a Beirut-educated Kurdish deputy from Ruwanduz, who had been interned in 1941, relieved Jalal Baban in Social Affairs in August. These ministers, whose appointment showed once more the small part played by party affiliations in the making of Ministries, were with changes to remain in office for half a year, and could achieve something but not much towards redressing 'Iraq's present misfortunes of penury, insecurity, and foreign entanglement.

The finances of the State went from bad to worse. No budget for 1948–9 was submitted until the end of the financial year; normal revenues fell off through bad trade, another bad harvest, tax evasion, and feeble administration; and a certain deficit on the year's work could not prevent the allotment to the Army of nearly 40 per cent. of available funds, and a substantial contribution for the care of the Palestine refugees. Oil royalties were halved by the stoppage of the Haifa pipeline, which, whatever the resulting losses to the Treasury, no Cabinet would dare to reopen in spite of approaches made by the British, French, and American Governments

Kurdish music is nevertheless played on a [illegible]

resembling the chanter of a bagpipe and has often a pleasant lilt. Kurdish dancing, however, is by no means as strenuous as Scottish. Kurds and all other mountain dwellers in Kurdistan dance what is known as the chain-dance, similar to that which is, I believe, commonly seen in the Balkans. The dancers join hands and form a ring. The piper and a drummer with a sort of tenor drum stand in the middle, and the dance consists of fairly intricate footwork while the circle moves slowly round. Often star dancers who fancy themselves as budding Nijinskys do solo dances inside the circle. Amongst the Kurds the men and women dance separately, but with the Christian sects the two sexes dance together. This does not mean, however, that Kurdish women are completely segregated or kept by themselves. As a matter of fact, they possess considerable freedom and may be seen gathering firewood, tending animals or engaged in other tasks on the mountainside, often far from their villages.

Up to five years ago the Barzan district of Kurdistan retained all of its savage and primitive features. Government had not penetrated and Shaikh Ahmed, a religious fanatic, was dictator. With the help of his brothers and a standing army of several hundred men he completely dominated the impoverished inhabitants, who had the shaikh's bodyguard perpetually billeted on them and who had to provide them with food, clothing and tobacco and anything else they might fancy. Any protests on the part of the villagers were discouraged by the strongest methods. Such complete ascendancy did Shaikh Ahmed gain over his savage and illiterate people that they began to look upon him as a god and, though Muslims in name, turned their faces towards him in prayer rather than towards Mecca, as tradition demands. There was a Mullah in the district called Mullah Juj, who represented himself to be the prophet of this new god. The Mullah was a very fiery and eloquent speaker and, unfortunately for himself, his fame began to surpass even that of the deity. This could not of course be tolerated, and one of Shaikh Ahmed's brothers "bumped off" the presumptuous prophet. Up to that time the Koran had been revered, but now the Shaikh issued orders for the destruction of all copies to be found. He also withdrew the ban on the eating of pork, for wild pig were plentiful in Barzan. Armed missionaries were sent out beyond the Barzan bounds, and villages which refused to accept the Shaikh were burned and a number of the male inhabitants put to death. This state of affairs could not be allowed to continue, and the 'Iraq Government was forced to take action in conjunction with the British Royal Air Force.

44 Wilson G-S (no date) 1937 MH Iraq MH
Kurd MH

Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani, where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil, where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran. During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Government to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popularize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful. Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret, tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited by the improvement in public security and communications and is

4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MH1 Iraq MH1
Kurd MA11

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now a flourishing market for the surrounding country and for trade with Turkey. It has one feature of great interest: an ancient bridge of Roman design, known locally as "Alexander's bridge," though unlikely to be in any way connected with the great conqueror. Tradition at Zakho has, however, another tale of the construction of the bridge. It is said to have been built by a celebrated local governor, who found that the keystone would not remain in place. He summoned a soothsayer, who proclaimed that it would never stand until a life had been built into the arch. The governor accepted the verdict and with his councillors, who were sworn to secrecy, decided that the first living thing to follow them on to the bridge the next morning would provide the necessary victim. They waited for some hours, but no one came. Then the governor's little daughter wondered why her father was so long away and taking her pet dog she set off to look for him. Her father was at first terrified when he saw her coming, but was relieved when he noticed that her dog was running in front of her. Alas, she thought it unfitting for the dog to approach her father before she did and so she called it and stepped on to the bridge. Public opinion compelled the governor to carry out the sacrifice and the girl was built into the centre of the arch and the keystone held and has gone on holding for hundreds of years.

I K 653 185

The development of Kurdistan has naturally not been popular with all the Kurds, and I remember an interesting incident. During the construction of the Amadia road, an elderly Agha stood for a while sadly watching the blasting of a pulpit of overhanging rock. When echoes of the explosion had died and the last fragments of stone had fallen into the rocky gorge below, he turned sorrowfully away. "The old days, the old days," he lamented. "Many is the time I lay behind that rock with my rifle and held up caravans for safe-conduct money."

I K 721 361

The town of Amadia, which, like Edinburgh Castle, is situated on a rocky plateau at a height of 4,100 feet, sixteen feet higher than Cairn Gorm, is now easily accessible by road. The town was formerly ruled by semi-independent Pashas who admitted a nominal suzerainty to the Turkish authorities. It has a stormy history, and the minaret of the mosque is pitted with bullet holes. These are souvenirs of 1925, when the Barzan Kurds, in alliance with some of the descendants of the old rulers of Amadia, attacked the town and succeeded in surrounding the Mosuli qaimaqam and a handful of police in the Government serai. The stout-hearted garrison held out until they were rescued by a body of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Semis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nesterian Church.

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4: Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MH1 Iraq MH1
Yazidis MH 10

The Yezidis in 'Iraq practically all dwell either in the Sinjār or Shaikhān districts. Each of these districts has a brass peacock and that belonging to Shaikhān must never cross the Tigris. If it did so the world would come to an end! Non-Yezidis cannot view the peacocks or the other sacred emblems, which include the "shema'dan" or candlestick and the "bairaqs" or banners. When not touring, all emblems are kept at the residence of the *Mir* at Baa'dhra in Shaikhān, though a few years ago the Sinjār Yezidis, who were at variance with the *Mir*, seized their peacock and collected subscriptions on their account until compelled by Government to return it to its lawful keeper. Yezidis object strongly to the use of the word "Shaitān" (Satan) or any word resembling it. Terms meaning "curse" are also never used less Satan construes them as a tactless reminder of his fall.

Owing to these difficulties and restrictions, Yezidis are not "good mixers" and rarely enter Government service. A few were formerly employed by the British Government in the transport company of the 'Iraq Levies, but did not prove very satisfactory. Occasionally they have enlisted in the 'Iraq army, but an attempt to apply a light measure of conscription to the Sinjār Yezidis resulted in an armed revolt by five villages. This necessitated punitive action with, unfortunately, heavy casualties on both sides. The Yezidis speak a form of Kurdish, but many also know Arabic. Ain Sifni or Ain-i-Safina (Spring of the Boat) is the chief market town of the Shaikhān Yezidis. It derives its name from a tradition that the Ark touched ground there.

Yezidis are to be found outside 'Iraq in the Caucasus and also a few thousand north of Aleppo.

It is difficult to believe that this curious religion can long survive in 'Iraq under present-day conditions. The *Mir* is unpopular and there is no better successor amongst his in-bred and degenerate relatives. The Yezidis have recently refused to yield him many of his former rights and have severely criticised his squandering of the religious revenues. Most of the members of the hierarchy have concentrated their energies on trying to divert funds to their own pockets and have quarrelled furiously. A certain number of stalwarts have defied the priests and attended schools. In the Sinjār prior to the Great War religious pressure induced a considerable number of Yezidis to adopt Islam, and it is within the bounds of possibility that ere long there may be a regular landslide to either the Christian or Islamic faith or both.

6: Ireland MH1 Iraq MH1

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/For an account of the conquest of Iraqi territories by the British in the 1914-18 War, see category 116, pp. 63-73./

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CHAPTER III

THE CONQUEST OF SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA

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In the four years, 1914 to 1918, British arms completed what three centuries of British commerce and diplomacy had begun. The military operations which resulted in the occupation of Basra, then of Baghdad in 1917, and finally of the whole of Turkish Arabia as far north as Mōsul, have been ably recounted elsewhere.[1] It is germane here only to indicate how the motives which lay behind the forward movements and the administration of the occupied territories arose partly from immediate circumstances and partly from the long established Middle East policy of Great Britain.

Consideration of Baghdad as an objective of the Expeditionary Force had come before its military and political officials early in the campaign. On November 23rd, the day after the occupation of Basra, Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer to the Force, telegraphed privately to the Viceroy that the General Officer Commanding had been considering the question of the advance to Baghdad and that he (Cox) did not see how 'we can well avoid taking over Baghdad'.[2] Officials on the spot, in India and at Whitehall as well as representatives of commercial interests in the country continued to give expression to similar views,[3] but neither H.M. Government nor the Government of

[1] *History of the Great War based on Official Documents:* (*a*) Moberly, Brig.-Gen., F. J., op. cit. (*O.H.*); (*b*) Corbett, Sir Julian, *Naval Operations*, Vol. II (1922); VI (1923); (*c*) Macpherson, *Medical Services, General History*, Vol. IV (1924). *Survey of India, Records of the*, Vol. XX. *The War Record* (1920). Candler, Edmund, *The Long Road to Baghdad* (2 vols., 1919). Personal accounts by Sir Arnold Wilson, Lieut.-Col. J. E. Tennant, C. V. Townshend and others.

[2] *O.H.*, Vol. I, p. 134. His telegram 'was specifically prompted by urgent representations from the Heads of the British Mercantile community'. Sir Percy Cox to the writer, July 16th, 1936.

[3] *Meso. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610, p. 97; Bolitho, H., *Lord Inchcape* (1936), pp. 122-4.

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India were ready, at the time, to support such a far-reaching objective.[1] Indeed the attitude of the latter towards the expedition until the middle of 1915 had been that of niggardly, even unwilling compliance with the policy laid down by H.M. Government.[2]

The sudden reversal of this attitude by the Government of India came after the appointment of General Sir John Nixon to the command in Mesopotamia, April 9th, 1915, when it assumed, with his support, the initiative for the advance to Baghdad.[3] Occurring almost at the same moment that the India Office, with a new concern for oil supplies, opposed any extension of objective beyond the hinterland of Basra, a deliberate and concerted policy was rendered impossible. The criticism of the Mesopotamia Commission of 1917: 'The scope of the objective of the expedition was never sufficiently defined in advance, so as to make each successive move part of a well-thought-out and matured plan,'[4] was never more pertinent than in the days before the first march on Baghdad.

The degree to which the reversal of the attitude of the Government of India and the sanction of H.M. Government to the advance on Baghdad were influenced by the realization that India's permanent interests would be best served by the inclusion of Baghdad under the direct control of India cannot be fully known until the evidence in state archives is available. In the late autumn of 1915 the Government of India stated clearly that it expected to annex at least Baghdad and Basra[5] but it would seem that considerations of the moment played as large a part in the authorization of the advance as did deliberate consideration of past and future policy.

Early successes around Basra had elated the military command in India, increasing their desire for further victories in

[1] *Meso. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610, p. 20; Asquith, H. A., *Memories and Reflections* (2 vols., 1928), Vol. II, p. 69; Bolitho, op. cit., p. 123.
[2] Cd. 8610, pp. 97, 105, 106, 123-31.
[3] Ibid., pp. 16, 97, 125.
[4] Ibid., p. 111; *O.H.*, Vol. III, preface.
[5] *Infra*, p. 96.

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order to demonstrate their importance, unduly cast in the shade in their own opinion, by the larger and more striking operations in Europe.[1] The advance to Baghdad would not only give these opportunities but would, as the Viceroy pointed out to the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Austen Chamberlain,

> create an immense impression in the Middle East, especially in Persia, Afghanistan, and on our frontier, and would counteract the unfortunate impression in the Middle East created by want of success in the Dardanelles. It would also isolate German parties in Persia,[2] probably produce a pacifying effect in that country, and frustrate the German plan of raising Afghanistan and the tribes, while the impression throughout Arabia would be striking. In India, the effect would be undoubtedly good.[3]

The Chief of General Staff, India, on October 5th, emplfasized in addition, that the possession of Baghdad would

> deprive the Turks of a well-equipped place of concentration; place us in a good position to defeat them in detail as they moved down the rivers from Asia Minor or Syria; deprive the Turks of steamers, material and resources, and increase our prestige.[4]

In the arguments put forward by the Government of India, H.M. Government fully concurred.[5] Indeed so convinced was the War Cabinet by 'Nixon's attitude and by opportunities within our grasp for a great success such as we have not yet achieved in any quarter, and the political (and even military) advantages which would follow from it throughout the East',

[1] Cd. 8610, p. 131.

[2] For German activities in Persia, Afghanistan and India in August and September, 1915, see *O.H.*, Vol. I, pp. 309 ff.

[3] Telegram (Private) Lord Hardinge to Chamberlain, October 6th, 1915, cited *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 11; also, Letter, Viceroy to Chamberlain, October 15th, 1915, cited ibid., p. 21.

[4] Appreciation, Sir Percy Lake, October 5th, 1915, cited ibid., pp. 9-10.

[5] Letter (Private), Chamberlain to Hardinge, October 7th, cited ibid., p. 8; Telegram S/S for India to Viceroy, October 6th, cited ibid., p. 11; Interdepartmental Comm. Report, October 16, cited ibid., p. 17.

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175** 721 not easily overrated,[1] that it authorized General Nixon to 'march on Baghdad if he is satisfied that the force he has available is sufficient for operations' and promised reinforcements from France.[2]

The disasters which followed, ending in the surrender, April 29th, of 13,309 British officers and other ranks at Kūt al-'Amāra, after a siege of five months, now form part of history. The Commission appointed by Parliament in 1916 to make inquiry into the conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia,[3] placed 'the weightiest share of responsibility for the first attempt on Baghdad' on Sir John Nixon, whose 'confident optimism was the main cause of the decision to advance'.[4] It must not be overlooked, however, that both he and those who advocated the advance at the time were not unnaturally influenced by immediate ends which outweighed military conditions, to meet which little or no adequate preparation had been made.

In the period after the unsuccessful attempts to relieve Kūt, and its surrender, when the Force lay inert, concerned mainly with renewing its strength and reorganizing its vital services,[5] the ultimate desirability of extending British influence to Baghdad was not entirely forgotten. Not until February 3rd, 1917, however, when the Russians were expected to converge on Mōsul and perhaps Baghdad, did Sir William Robertson ask General Maude for his views regarding another advance towards Baghdad, it being considered desirable for political reasons that British forces should occupy the city before the Russians.[6]

[1] Telegram, S/S for India to Viceroy, October 6th, cited ibid., p. 11.
[2] Ibid., October 23rd, cited ibid., p. 28.
[3] *Meso. Comm. Report*, Cd. 8610.
[4] Ibid., p. 111. General Nixon had repeatedly shown his confidence that he had enough troops to capture the city; Telegrams, Nixon to Government of India and India Office, October 6th, 1915, cited *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 12; Nixon to Chamberlain, October 8th, 1915, cited ibid., p. 15; Viceroy to Chamberlain, October 6th, 1915, cited ibid., p.11. Telegram (Private), Chamberlain to Hardinge, October 5th, 1915, cited ibid., p. 9.
[5] *O.H.*, Vol. III, pp. 7, 20-3, 30-6, 62-70. [6] Ibid., pp. 125, 126 and 204 ff

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SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA

The inquiry, followed by definite instructions on February 28th, 1917, to capture Baghdad[1] were not influenced merely by the traditional opposition to the installation of Russia in Turkish Arabia. Circumstances arising from more deeply rooted aspirations, together with the same general considerations which had prompted the advance of 1915, were also at work.[2]

The pre-war aspirations of the powers for economic and political expansion in Asia had taken on a concrete form as important war objectives of the Allies on the basis of the so-called Secret Agreements. These, as far as they affected the Ottoman Empire, were as follows: (1) Constantinople Agreement, March 18th, 1915, by Russia, France and Great Britain concerning Constantinople, the Straits and Persia;[3] (2) Pact of London, April 26th, 1915, between Great Britain, Russia and Italy regarding compensation to Italy for joining the Allies against Germany;[4] (3) Husain-McMahon Correspondence, August, 1914, to January, 1916, concerning Arab independence in return for Arab co-operation against the Turks;[5] (4) Agreements of the spring of 1916, between Great Britain, France and

[1] *O.H.*, Vol. III, p. 205.

[2] The Government of India again pressed for the capture of Baghdad on the grounds that it would relieve the increasing tension on the North West Frontier, *O.H.*, Vol. III, p. 207.

[3] Text, de Martens, C., *Recueil des Traites*, 3rd Series (Leipzig, 1922), Vol. X, p. 347. Also, Temperley, H. W. V., *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (hereafter *H.P.C.P.*) (6 vols., 1920-4), Vol. VI, pp. 2-10; *Manchester Guardian*, February 22nd, 1918.

[4] *Accts. and Papers*, Misc. Papers, 1920, No. 7 (Cmd. 671), LI, 261. Text: de Martens, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 329; *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. V, pp. 384 ff.; also, Vol. VI, pp. 10-13.

[5] The complete text of the correspondence has never been officially revealed, but summaries of substantial portions have been published: MacMunn, Sir G., and Falls, C., *Military Operations, Egypt and Palestine* (Official History of the World War, hereafter cited as *O.H., E. and Pal.*) (2 vols., 1928-30), Vol. I, pp. 213 ff.; *Le Temps* (Paris), September 19th, 1919; Cocks, Seymour, *The Secret Treaties* (1918); *Note on the Arab Question*, submitted by Amir Faisal to H.M. Government and cited *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. CXXXVI (1929), pp. 735-6; *Al-Mandr* (Arabic journal, Cairo), January 5th, 1924. The summaries given here have been taken from the original Arabic text of the letters.

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'IRAQ

175* 721 Russia—(*a*) Sykes-Picot Agreement, May 16th, 1916, between Great Britain and France, concerning the division of Syria and Mesopotamia between themselves and the Arabs;[1] (*b*) Russia's assent to an agreement which assigned her northern Kurdistan and portions of Eastern Anatolia;[2] (5) The Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, April 17th, 1917, between Great Britain, France and Italy, concerning Italy's share of Asia Minor.[3]

The Ottoman Empire, from which Germany was to be excluded, was, by the Agreements, divided among the Allies in accordance with their long-standing ambitions. In addition, large sections of the Empire were assigned to potential allies to draw them into the war against the Central Powers. Thus, Italy demanded and received recognition, by the Pact of London, April 26th, 1915, of her claims to an 'equitable' section of Asia Minor. In return for his revolt against the Turks, Husain, Sharif of Mecca, received promises through the so-called Husain-McMahon Correspondence of British aid for the establishment of Arab independence in a large portion of the Arabic-speaking provinces of Turkey.[4]

In the Correspondence, however, Sir Henry McMahon made reservations safeguarding the interests of Great Britain

[1] Text: de Martens, op. cit., Vol. x, p. 350; *L'Asie Française*, XVII (August-November, 1919), pp. 243 ff.; Samné, G., *La Syrie* (Paris, 1920), p. 638 ff.; Loder, J. de V., *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria* (1923), pp. 161-4. The Foreign Office 'version' in Leslie, Shane, *Mark Sykes; His Life and Letters* (1923), pp. 250-8, is nothing more than an explanation of the circumstances under which the Agreement was made.

[2] See Memorandum of March 6th, 1917 (first printed in *Izvesta*, November 12th, 1917); *Manchester Guardian*, January 19th, 1918; de Martens, op. cit., Vol. x, p. 353; *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, p. 16. For negotiations in which Russia participated, see documents in *Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei Während des Weltkrieges: Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei* (Adamoff, E., ed., Dresden, 1932) (hereafter *Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei*), especially Nos. 56, 60, 74-8, 99, 103, 104.

[3] Reputed text: *Manchester Guardian*, January 9th, 1920; *Current History* (New York), Vol. XI (March, 1920), pp. 499 ff.; see also *H.P.C.P.*, Vol. VI, pp. 18 ff.

[4] Letters, Sir H. McMahon, Cairo, to Husain, Sharif of Mecca, October 24th, December 14th, 1915; also, August 30th, 1915. See also, Young, Major Sir H. W., *The Independent Arab* (1933), pp. 276-7.

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and those of her ally, France.[1] Previous agreements which Great Britain had with the Arab chiefs were to be unaltered.[2] Basra was to be placed under British control[3] while Baghdad, concerning which it was declared that a stable government was demanded by the very special British interests in the region,[4] was to be the subject of future negotiations.[5] It was also stipulated that the prospective Arab state should receive only British aid and assistance, and should employ, exclusively, British advisers.[6] The Sharif had, at first, protested at the conditions concerning 'Iraq, which, he declared, by history and religion, formed an integral part of Arab territory.[7] It was agreed, however, to leave the final decision to the future, the British to pay an indemnity for any part of 'Iraq which they occupied, even temporarily.[8]

The Sykes-Picot Agreement[9] was to regulate future Anglo-French territorial relations in the eastern Mediterranean and to govern future British policy in points of conflict arising from the interpretation of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence and the Agreement. It confirmed the arrangements made by the Anglo-Arab correspondence by assigning Basra and

[1] Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, December 14th, 1915; also, January 25th, 1916. The reservation of territory along the eastern Mediterranean in the interests of France were not recognized by the Sharif, who agreed, however, to postpone the decision until the end of the war. Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, January 1st, 1915. The claim of an existing secret treaty giving all of Arab-Asia to Sharif Husain has never been proven. *Infra*, p. 177.

[2] Letters, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, Section 1; Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915.

[3] Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, 1915.

[4] Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, December 14th, 1915.

[5] Letter, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915; Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, January 25th, 1916.

[6] Letter, Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, October 24th, 1915.

[7] Letter, Sharif Husain to Sir H. McMahon, November 5th, 1915.

[8] Ibid., Sir H. McMahon to Sharif Husain, January 25th, 1916.

[9] The frequent assertion that T. E. Lawrence, 'had much to do with the Sykes-Picot Agreement' (Main, '*Iraq*, p. 58) is scarcely' accurate. The first intimation received by Sir Henry McMahon, or anyone else in Cairo, of the agreement seems to have been when Sir Mark Sykes, 'in conversation, producing a map, remarked, "What do you think of my treaty?",' Hart, H. B. Liddell, *T. E. Lawrence* (1934), p. 70. See also Leslie, op. cit., pp. 244, 245, 249, 287, 288.

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175 721 Baghdad to British control, and by designating a strip of territory lying between Baghdad and the zone of territory around Mōsul, assigned to French influence, as a zone to be given to the Arabs, subject to British influence.

The necessity of capturing Baghdad as a preliminary to the application of these secret agreements thus became one of the primary political arguments in favour of the renewed advance towards Baghdad. Its capture would also restore British prestige, seriously shaken by the surrender of Kūt and by the attempt, suggested by General Townshend himself, April 23rd,[1] and sanctioned by the War Cabinet,[2] to purchase the freedom of the besieged army for a sum of £2,000,000. The capture would, in addition, encourage the Allied Powers and dishearten the Central Powers.[3]

The occupation of Baghdad would present a better opportunity to organize Arab co-operation, a step which H.M. Government had repeatedly stressed from the inception of the campaign and to facilitate which the War Cabinet was to sanction the Proclamation of March 19th, 1917, issued under the name of General Maude, following the capture of Baghdad, March 11th, 1917.[4]

Among the reasons originally urged for the dispatch of the Expedition, it will be remembered, was the hope that it would secure the assistance of the Arabs against the Turks and prevent them from joining in a *Jihād*.[5] With these ends in view, proclamations had been addressed to the Shaikhs of the Gulf and to the Arabs of Turkish Arabia by H.M. Political

[1] *O.H.*, Vol. II, p. 450.
[2] Ibid., p. 452.
[3] The tremendous store set by Germany and Turkey on Baghdad and the plans which they elaborated for its recapture have been well described by Djemal (Jamal) Pasha in *Memories of a Turkish Statesman* (n.d.). During the war, he, himself, regarded Palestine and Syria as more important centres, although he had once, when Pasha of Baghdad, described 'Iraq as 'an iron gate against the great power to the south, that is, India'. Speech on the Inauguration of Jamal Bey as Pasha of Baghdad, August 30, 1911.
[4] For text see Appendix I.
[5] *Supra*, pp. 27-8.

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Officers, both before and after the occupation of Basra.[1] It was emphasized that 'this War has nothing to do with religion'.[2] The Shaikhs were urged not to 'allow the foolish people to be led away by foolish talk of "Jehad".' The Arabs were assured that the British Government bore 'no enmity or ill-will against the populace';[3] that it had 'no desire to treat them as enemies so long as they themselves remain friendly and neutral and refrain from taking up arms against her (British) troops'.[4] On the contrary, the British Government hoped 'to prove good friends and protectors'. The inhabitants were assured that, under the British flag, they would 'enjoy the benefits of liberty and justice both in regard to your religious and your secular affairs'.[5] They were warned, however, that while it was 'the wish of the British Government to free the Arabs from the oppression of the Turks and bring them advancement and increase of prosperity and trade', yet, 'in the case of those departing from the the path of friendship and neutrality and taking up arms in co-operation with the enemy, their properties lying within the sphere of British control will be considered sequestrated to the British Government'.[6] This warning had already been conveyed to them in an emphatic notice on the outbreak of war and dated November 5th, 1914.[7]

Neither the assurances nor the warnings conveyed in these proclamations nor the personal efforts of Sir Percy Cox and his assistant Political Officers were sufficient to win over the Arabs

[1] *Compilation of Proclamations, Notices, etc. . . . Relating to . . . Mesopotamia, October 31st, 1914 to August 31st, 1919* (Baghdad, 1919) (hereafter, *Proclamations*, 1914-19). Notices and Proclamations, Nos. 1-5, 7, 8. An interesting parallel to the Proclamations of 1914 may be seen in the instructions to Captain Seton, Political Officer to the expeditions against pirates of the Persian Gulf, 1809. See Low, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 325.

[2] *Proclamations*, 1914-19, Notice No. 1, October 31st, 1914; Proclamation No. 2, November 1st, 1914; Proclamation No. 3, November 1st, 1914.

[3] Ibid., Proclamation No. 5, November 22nd, 1914.

[4] Ibid., Notice No. 7, February 14th, 1915; cf. also, Notice No. 4, November 5th, 1914.

[5] Ibid., Proclamation No. 5, November 22nd, 1914.

[6] Ibid., Notice No. 7, February 14th, 1914.

[7] Ibid., Notice No. 4, November 5th, 1914.

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as a whole to the British side. The problem of gaining Arab co-operation in accepting responsible posts in the Administration or in fighting the Turks hung largely on the ability of Great Britain to give the Arabs tangible evidence that the Turks would never return to the country. Confiscation of property would be the least of the reprisals which the Turks would inflict if they ever returned, as the Arabs well knew; a knowledge confirmed by Turkish treatment of the Arabs of Kūt al-'Amāra after its surrender.

Such assurance could not be given, however, not only for fear of giving umbrage to the allies of Great Britain, but also because the question of the advance on Baghdad was still in the air, and the future status of the country was still in doubt in official quarters.[1] Not even those familiar with the intimate relationship which Turkish Arabia bore to India or responsible for the administrative policy of the country could make reassuring public announcements, although they confidently expected Mesopotamia to be 'an Indian appendage' as Sir Valentine Chirol wrote in 1915, while accompanying the Viceroy of India on an official visit to Basra.[2] The Viceroy himself on the occasion of the visit had made a speech, interpreted by many as foreshadowing annexation to India.[3]

Private assurances as given by Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer, on behalf of H.M. Government to various individuals, such as the Shaikh of Kuwait and the Shaikh of Mohammerah, had limited credence. To the former, in a letter dated November 3rd, 1914, three days before the landing at Fao, Sir Percy Cox had declared that if the British succeeded at Basra, 'we will not return Basra to the Turkish Government and will not surrender it back to them at all'.[4]

[1] Asquith, Herbert, wrote in his diary, March 25th, 1915: 'Grey and I ... both think that in the real interests of our own future the best thing would be if at the end of the War we could say that we had taken and gained nothing ... Mesopotamia for instance.' Asquith, H. A., op. cit., Vol. II, p. 69.
[2] *Behind the Veil*, pp. 91-2 (facsimile, p. 119).
[3] *Proclamations*, 1914-19. Speech No. 6, February 6th, 1915, p. 3.
[4] Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. XI, Persian Gulf No. xliii.

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SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA

Lacking definite and public assurances, the great majority of the Arabs, both townsmen and tribesmen, while feathering their nests at every opportunity, refused to commit themselves. They preferred to let time and circumstances decide the question on whom their permanent allegiance should be bestowed.

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539 joined the caravan. It marched at the sixth hour, and its destination was Baghdad.

539 721 And when they had been two days on the road, and the caravan was traversing the territories of the Shammar of the Jezira, they came on Bedawin, raiders, mounted on horses and on fine camels, and the riders rode up to the caravan and cried: Who be you, where do you go, from whence do you come, and by whose permission? And the Turkish officers and soldiers who were guarding the caravan cried out: We march by order of the Government. Make way! Make way! And the raiders shouted: Are the Ottomans, then, a Government? Know you that we are the Government here, and this is our customs post, and here we levy excise. And as for the caravan, we permit it to proceed when we have levied the tax, and as for the soldiers, we disarm them and permit them to return from whence they have come, but they shall go on foot.

And the Turkish officers saw that the tribesmen were many, well mounted and well armed, so they ordered their soldiers to lay down their arms, crying: Moslems! Spare our lives! And the tribesmen said: Our pledge is given. And the Turks dismounted from their horses and turned back on foot towards Mosul, and their arms they left on the ground.

Then the tribesmen cried out: Merchants, unload your camels and open your loads, that we may inspect the merchandise and levy the tax. And the merchants and camel men made the camels kneel and commenced unloading them. And Daoud was standing by a load of copper vessels and he saw that they were copper water pots of that shape which has a narrow neck through which the hand cannot pass and which has a long straight

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spout, and which has only one use, and that is known to you. For is it not used for cleansing in the closet? And Daoud thought after this manner: Why should I not slip my jewels into one of these pots, for do the Bedawin use these water pots? They will never levy a tax on these goods.

So Daoud took his bag of gold and jewels and made it long and thin and he slipped it down the neck of a water pot, nor did any see him do it. And the tribesmen came and inspected the loads, crying: Merchants, the tax is half to us and half to you, for you failed to notify us of your coming, that we might come to some other agreement. And they inspected the loads and from each load they took half and left half. And verily those Bedawin took those things that their hearts desired, of silks and linens and Mosul cloth, of rugs and carpets, of sugar and tobacco, of watches and clocks, of saddles and blankets and almonds and honey, of threads and needles and cheeses and charcoal, and they even took an umbrella. But when they came to the load of water pots they laughed and said: We permit these goods to pass exempt and tax free.

And men from amongst the men, the raiders, searched each of the merchants and took from them their purses and opened them, saying: These gold coins bear the cipher of the Ottomans and are confiscated, for we do not permit their circulation in our land. And they came on Daoud and searched him, but they found with him neither goods not gold, so they questioned him, saying: Merchant, where are your goods and where is your wealth? And Daoud replied, saying: I am not a wealthy merchant. I am only a poor coppersmith making enough for my needs, and I go to Baghdad where my mother is sick, and not for purposes of trade. And they took him and led him away,

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x539 saying: O coppersmith in the fine linen thob, come with
721 us and we will give you food enough for your needs, and
• may God heal your mother.

And when the Bedawin were finished with the caravan they permitted it to depart, but as for Daoud, they kept him, and he watched the load of copper water pots march away, and in one of the pots was his treasure. And Daoud remained with the Bedawin, even with the Shammar, for many weeks. They fed him with food, but they made him load the camels and unload the camels, and lift and carry the hair tents and heavy loads, and they made him clean the dishes and cooking pots, and on the march they made him walk with the sheep, nor did they permit him to ride. And each evening at sunset they said to him: Were you only a wealthy merchant and not a poor coppersmith you could proceed to Baghdad, after payment of the tax.
x539 What a pity that you have to stay here and labour, and may God heal your sick mother. And one evening when he was exhausted from labour in the heat of the day, Daoud cast himself at the feet of the Sheikh, crying: Merciful Sheikh, punish me if you must, for I deceived you. I was indeed wealthy and had with me much gold and precious stones, but I hid my wealth from your tax-gatherers in a water pot. But it marched away with the caravan, and now since many weeks are past, I may never find my treasure again. And the Sheikh laughed much at the words of Daoud, and he said: O Nazarene, your luck is faint and weak, for you have indeed fallen into misfortune. You have less chance of finding that water pot in the City of Peace than of recovering a dirhem dropped in a sand-storm. I permit you to depart and I postpone the payment of the tax. But should you find your water pot, I command you to pay a tax of one copper fils to my agent in